Final report of Chief of Air Service A.E.F. to the Commander in Chief American Expeditionary Forces

              Auburn University Libraries
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AIR SERVICE INFORMATION CIRCULAR
Vol. II
(AVIATION)
PUBLISHED BY THE CHIEF OF AIR SERVICE, WASHINGTON, D. C.
February 15, 1921 No. 180
FINAL REPORT
OF
CHIEF OF AIR SERVICE
A. E. F.
TO THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF Z
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES
WASHINGTON
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
1921
Ralph Brown Draughon
LIBRARY
MAR 28 2013
Non-Oepoitory
Auburn University
. TABLE OF CONTENTS.
Page Page.
Chapt€r !.-Achievement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
IL-The Woevre and the Marne. . . . . . . . . . . 3
JII.--St. Mihiel and the Argonne-Meuse.. ... 9
IV.-Early problems and their solutions.. ... 21
V.-Reo}"ganization and development....... 28
VI.-Period of expansion................... 30
VIL-The working organization. . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Chapter X.- Training ......................... , . . . 43
VIII.- Diffi.culties.... . .... .................... 37
IX.-Scope of activities and general remarks.. 40
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XL- The Supply Section. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
XII.-The Technical Section ....... : ........ 62
XIII.-The Balloon Section . .. :.... . . .. ...... 64
XIV.-The Aircraft Armament Section... . .... 68
XV.-The Photographic Section.... ... ...... 71
XVI.-The Radio Section.................... 73
XVII.-The medical consultant............... 74
XVIII.--Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
FINAL REPORT OF CHIEF OF AIR SERVICE, AMERICXN
EXPEDITIONARY FORCES. r ~
EDITOR'S NOTE.
The following is the final report of Maj. Gen. Maaon M. Patrick, Chief of Air Service, American Expeditionary
Forces, rendered to the Commander in Chief American Expeditionary Forc~s, in March, 1919. The report is quoted
verbatim with the exception of the fact that all statistics included herein ha.,ve been revised to date.
CHAPTER !;-ACHIEVEMENT.
When hostilities ceased on November 11, 1918, there
were actually assigned to armies 45 American squadrons
and 767 pilots, 481 observers, 23 aerial gunnel's, and the
·complement of soldiers. These squadrons were equipped
with 740 airplanes, with armament of the latest type, and
the flying personnel, trained in Air Service schools, wa!l
second to none in the world for aggressiveness and skill.
Twelve of these squadrons were equipped with American
,built airplanes and Liberty engines. This engine in
actual service fulfilled the highest hopes of it which had
been entertained in the United States.
On the Marne, at St. Mihiel, and in the Argonne our air
forces were pitted against the best which Germany could
produce, and the results show that the enemy more than
met his match. Our pilots shot down 781 enemy air­planes
which were officially confirmed, and many others,
too far behind the lines to be confirmed by our own wit­nesses,
but which were nevertheless undoubtedly de­stroyed.
They also destroyed 73 (confirmed) enemy bal­wons.
Our total losses in air battles were 289 airplanes
and 48 balloons brought down by the enemy.
Our squadrons, in round numbers, took part in 150
bombing raids, during which they dropped over 275,000
pounds of explosives on the enemy. They flew 35,000
hours over the lines and took 18,000 photographs of enemy
positions, from which 585,000 prints were made by the
Photographic Sections .attached to observation -groups.
On innumerable occasions they regiilated the fire of our
Artillery, flew in contact with Infantry during attacks,
and from a height of only a few yards from the ground they
machine-gunned and bombed enemy batteries, convoys
and troops on the march.
Of the 35 balloon companies then in France, with 446
officers and 6,365 men, there were 23 companies servi~
with the armies at the front. This balloon personnel had
also been trained in American Expeditionary Forces
schools and in every test proved its worth. Our balloons
at the front made 1,642 ascensions and were in the air a
total of 3,111 hours. They made 316 artillery adjustments,
each comprising all the shots fired at one target; they
reported 12,018 shell bursts, sighted 11,856 enemy air­planes,
reported enemy balloon ascensions 2,649 times,
enemy batteries 400 times, enemy traffic and roads and
railroads 1,113 times, explosions and destructions 597 times.
Air Service depots to supply the squadrons and balloon
companies at the front were in full operation and othera
were being prepared to maintain this force, which was to
be increased rapidly. Needed steps had been 'taken to
provide for the equipment of this force as it was placed at
the front, and it was certain that it could be fully main•
tained. A production plant had been built and was in
full operation, where some 10,000 men were employed in
assembling airplanes and in repairing airplanes, engines,
and balloons which had seen service at .the front.
Our balloons were attacked by enemy airpl~nes · on 89
occasions; 35 of them were burned during such attacks,
12 others were destroyed by shell fire, and 1 blown over
enemy lines. Our observers jumped from the baskets
116 times; in no case did the parachute fail to open
properly. One ol:iserver lost his life because pieces of the
burning balloon fell on his descending parachute.
CHAPTER II.-THE WOEVRE AND THE MARNE;
THE TOUL SECTOR. airdromes which provided all needed facilities. In the
The Air Service, American Expeditionary Forces, com- air, as on the ground, the enemy was comparatively in­menced
actual operations at the front in the spring of 1918. active, using this sector, as did the French, either as a
The Toul sector was chosen as the place where American rest area for tired units or a.s a position to be held by units
squadrons would be located and given their final practice which had not been so thoroughly trained. It was well
to bridge over the gap which must always exist between recognized that these conditions imposed one serious dis­training
in schools and work under actual war conditions. advantage. . They bred false ideas · of what constituted
In this locality the opposing armies were facing each other real war, for, from the beginning the staff of the American
in two well-defined positions, and since the early days of Expeditionary Forces thoroughly understood that move­the
wai' this had been a comparatively quiet sector. ment constitutes the essence of war. However, our state
Means of liaison had been developed and there existed of preparedness, a situation which will always be en-
(3)
50
4
LIDJ:l!D
~l'U!lSUI!l'
~ OB~ERVAT}ON
-·.DAY BOMBING
~ NiuHT 00!.!BDIG
COMBAT SQUADRONS IN AMERICAN E. F.
(DAT( OF ASSIGNMENT AND DEMOBILIZATION)
::.iept . 12, 1918. !''irat ~ay Of ~t. L,ihiel offcn::..ivc .
t>opt. 26, 19)8. nrst Lay of lt'irs t .1.rgonne L:oUso
offensive. ,
wov. 1, 1918-. l!'lre t Dey of Last Arr:-;onne Uouso offencito.
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FIG. 1 •
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DROii DATE A5SIG!I_ED DA'l'E
NO. ERI TYPE TO Tl!E ORll2REll
AI, FRONT DE!IOBIL IUD
110.
l l Cor. Obs .• April O, 19],8 July 1, 1919
2 94 Pnr~ui t k~_rn·· 9, " Apr_, 7, 1919
3 12 · Oor. Obs, Ap~!l' ,;<) • " ~~r, 7, 1919
4 · 95 Pur, u1 t ~~oy 4, " lloo. ·cs. 1918
$ 91 Arm// Oba, 1:.a.v 7, ,, Apr. 7, 1919
6 88 Cor., Obs. !ta;r U, " Mey 1l, ·1919
7 96 D, Bo!Jlb, lda.v Z9, " Deo.n, 1na
~ 27 Pursuit !fay 29, " Dec, ~. \918
9 147 Pursuit· lley 29, " Deo,· ·s; .lJ1i~.
10 90 C,or; Ob.a, Jw,e 11, ,, Ll<Jo,19, igltl
11 99 Oor. Oba. June 12, " Feb,13, 1919
12 139 l'ureui.t June ll!, " -lloo,11, 1918
13 13 I'Jir•u.lt June 28, " .l>eo • 5, 1_91.8
14 103 .Pursuit ( ) .Juno :lO; " Oeo ,11, 1910
1.5 135 Cor, Ob~. ,July 28, " Fofi. 5 , 1919
16 104 Cor, Obs. AUil• 7, " llec,19, 1918
17 8 Cor . Obs. "A\1/5• 14, " Fdb, 5, J919
18 24 Anrry. Oba. Al\/l'.• 14, " July 1, 1919
·1, 49 l'urs\\l t .A11i·t .14, " l'eo. 5, l9i8
20 5.0 Cor. Obs. Au,;, 14., " /,pr. 2, .1919
21 93 Pursu1t1 Aug, l4, " Dec .11, .1910
22 213 I·ursui t Aue·. 14, ,, Apr,.10, 1919
?.3 22 ~~\1tC Aug, 22, " Ar,r,lO, 1919
24 28 Pure~: t j.ug, ·22; " Apr.;10, 19i9
25 9 tr• Obe. Aug. 26 , " M~y 1.1, 1919
26 11 D, ·3omb:, · Sept. 5, " reo ,11, 1918
27 20 D. J!o,ab. ·s~pt. . ~ . ) I Dec .11, 19}8
28 258 Oor. O~a. oopt. 10, . .; July 1 ; 19 ~
29 166 P, &omb, sept_. ~o. :11 Apr. 7, 1919
30 1°68 Cor., o·bs , Sep~ ... :3o, " )J~ 10. 1919
31 185 Pureuit Oc-t . $, " Apr,10, 1919
32 141 liμ:su1t 06:t: Hi;. ... !f.-., 11, 1919
33 ~54 COT, Oba, Oot, P.1; ,, :lla:v 11, 1919
34 25 Pur1)llt Oct, 22, ;, Apr. O, 1919
35 85 At;n1 Obe. Oe t, 2:5·, " .lley 11, 1919 '
'36 186 Ar,cy Obs, Oc .t. 25; " July l, 1919
37 100 D~ ~omb., Octi, 26, " A:i)r, 8,. 1919
38 163 D, Bomb, Cot, 21; " t.pr; e, .l .919
39 138 Pursuit Oot, · 28, " Jui,,- 1; 1919
40 638 l'ursu1 t Oct, .28, " ltSf 11, _1919
41 41 Purauit Oct .• 29, " lla,r u, 1919.
4~ 278 Army db<!. O,ct, .29, " ,lil\Y μ, 1919
43 17 ~suit ( ] Iiov, •• ·" .Ded.11; "1918
44 1'48 l'u.rsurt ( ,l!!ov, •• • l.lec,11, 1918
4,5 155 N. Bomb,· It,o:v• 9, • ·o.o. s; 1~18
(al B~gan wi,k 7/15/18 wlth· 11,A,P, ·Ill field. bl Ulisn work i(.20/1.8 w1tl>"l'l,A,.i', 1n ·tleld.
(o )•!pl) 1'ork thfJ/lli with 111:• A,8, in rlold,
countered where actual preparation for war must be car­ried
on while the war is waged, made it seem wiser to
take but one step at a time, and fortunately this particular
part of the western front remained inactive until the
St. Mihiel offensive on September 12, 1918.
CORPS OBSERVATION.
5
In April, 1918, tlie 1st Corps Observation Group, con­sisting
of the 1st, 12th, and 88th Squadrons, was organized.
The pilots for the most part were men who had never
served at the front. On the other hand, the observers had
nearly all seen service with French squadrons and their
experience so gained proved of great value. This group
was placed under the tactical control of the French 37th
Army Corps and under ihe administrative control of the
American 1st Army Corps. Its mission was primarily to
keep the compi.and informed by visual and photographic
reconnaissances of the general situation within and behind
the e:r;temy lines. To accomplish this, a routine schedule
of operations was prescribed for each day, consisting of
several close-range reconnaissances of the sector., and
toward dusk a reconnaissance for hostile batteries in action.
In addition to this routine . work, special missions were
arranged, in many instances for the day following. Artil­lery
adjustments, in particular, were carried out, and
many long distance and special reconnaissances. Except
in the one case of the attack on Seicheprey, no opportu­nities
offered for contact patrols.
VALUE OF EXPERIENCE IN THE TOUL SECTOR.
From a command point of view the work of this group
in ·the Toul sector was comparatively unimportant.
There were no marked opportunities for obtaining i°nforma­tion
of value, as no active operations occurred. The
instruction of the group itself in its duties during this
time was carried on consistently and with great advantage.
Individuals made rapid strides in learning the details
of their duties and except training in actual combat they
had arrived at a state of excellence by the time they
were to take part in real warfare. This period was also
utilized in organizing and operating the group as such,
as opportunity existed for so doing without paying the
ordinarily ti-eavy price of mistakes in war. A proper
organization was evolved rapidly and the principles and
methods established stood the test of time. Changing
conditions made minor modifications necessary, but the
essentials proved sound and were the model for succeeding
groups.
WORK IN QUIET SECTORS.
During this period one of these squadrons was detached
for duty in the Baccarat sector, where its ~perience was
along the same lines as those followed by the other two
squadrons in the Toul sector.
During the summer while American divisions were in
line in the Vosges Mountains the 99th Aero Observation
Squadron received its first battle training, operating over
the southern end of this sector and participating in the
attack on Frapelle.
ARMY OBSERVATION.
The 91st Squadron, our first army observation unit,
commenced active operations on the front on June 6, 1918,
also in this Toul ·sector. Its personnel, too, had much to
learn of its work from its own experience. The best
methods to employ in obtaining information of the enemy's
rear areas were studied and developed. Many material
difficulties in doing photographic work were met ii.nd
overcome. Aerial gunnery was brought to a high degree
of efficiency. Formation flying was constantly practiced
and when active operations began in this sector the 91st
Squadron had gained confidence in itself and had acquired
knowledge of long-distance reconnaissance that proved
of great value to our staff in later operations. It may be
noted here that subsequently officers of the allied armies
who knew the work done by this squadron stated em­phatically
that no better work had been done at any time
during the war by any observation squadron on the
western front.
DAY BOMBARDMENT.
Day hombardment had its beginning on May 18, 1918,
when the 96th Aero Squadron was established on the
Amanty airdome, also in this Toul sector. Its personnel
had received some _training with both French and British
units. The shape of the St. Mihiel salient and the installa­tions
within and behind it offered excellent opportunities
for bombing. The first raid was made on June 12, when
the yards at Dommary-Baroncourt were successfully
attacked. Early in July owing to overeagerness in
adverse weather an. entire flight of this squadron. was lost,
and as at this time there was also difficulty in replacing
equipment, the squadron was somewhat crippled. By
August equipment had been secured and 20 successful
raids were made during this month. These did consid­erable
material damage, but even more important was the
moral effect produced. Bombing has a great effect upon
all troops and according to French intelligence reports
the enemy took to his dugouts long before the bombers
reached their objectives.
Much tactical knowledge was gained by this sq1,1adron
while in the 'foul sector. By trial the most satisfactory
formation for encountering enemy pursuit was developed .
The enemy methods· of attack were studied closely, and
the exp~rience gained proved of value during the more
serious enemy efforts which were made·later.
PURSUIT.
The Toul sector likewise served as a place for giving final
practice to the pursuit units. The 94th Pursuit Squadron.
commenced operations on April 14, 1918, and on that same
day, thanks largely to the excellent liaison with the anti­aircraft
defenses and to blunders of the enemy, two enemy
airplanes were shot down in our lines without loss to our­selves.
The moral effect of this was grea'.t and from this
very first day our pursuit squadrons showed in their work
that aggressive spirit and high morale which alone can
win in war.
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O •dOOK:,
In May, 1918, three other squadrons were. ready to be
sent i11to battle, and the 1st Pursuit Group of four squadrons
was formed. Fortunately, there were among the pilots
eome who had served with the Lafayette Escadrille and
their experience in war was invaluable in teaching our
new pilots, who had much to learn . . The very best of
school work can :p.ot give a pilot the atmQ.sphere and feel­ing
of the front. Not alone is this true in general, but
schooling can not impress upon the students the relative
importance of vision in the air, aerial gunnery, formation
flying and fighting, and acrobacy. In particular, team­work
and formation flying had to be emphasized at the
front. These matters were vigorously undertaken, and
with marked success. For a time the enemy was neither
numerous nor aggressive and combats were infrequent,
but there was always the atmosphere and many of the con­ditions
which prevailed in active w~rfare.
7
In June, 1918, advantage was taken of bombing raids
carried on by the British· Independent Air Force to co­operate
by attacking enemy pursuit airplanes which sought
to interfere with these raids, and on three occasions enemy
pursuh airplanes were shot down by our pilots.
Our pursuit squadrons, like the observation squadrons,
came out, after their stay in the Toul sector, while not
veteran fighting orgamzations, yet possessed of excellent
morale, and well equipped to undertake the more serious
work in which they were about to be engaged.
BALLOONS.
This quiet sector was also chosen for the development
of our balloon companies. In February, 1918, the 2d
Balioon Company joined the 1st Division, which was then
in line. Two other companies (one sent to this Toul secUlr,
one to near Baccarat) reached the front in April,. relieving
French companies. Specialists from French units re­mained
with our balloon companies until the men had
become sufficiently adept, which ordinarily required but
a short time.· After our own companies had been thus
trained they themselves undertook the training of newly
arriving American balloon units. The mission of these
balloon companies was to regulate artillery fire, to locate
targets, to report all activity within the enemy lines by
day and, when possible, by night.
THE MARNE AND THE VESLE.
The work of all of our air forces became of a much
sterner type when they entered more active sectors which
were the scenes of hard fighting in July and August. The
operations on the Marne and the V esle may be roughly
divided into three periods-the preparation for the ex­pected
German offensive, which came on July 15; the
crushing of that offensive and preparations for the Allied
counter offensive of July 18; and this cminter offensive
itself, from Soissons to Chateau Thierry, with the conse­quent
retreat of the Germans to the line of the V esle and
later to the Aisne. Each of these periods called for a
somewhat: different disposition of the air forces to effect
the best results.
OBSERVATION.
The 1st Corps Observation Group, consisting of the 1st
and 12th Aero Squadrons, reached the Marne sector dur-ing
the first days of July, 1918, and occ«pied an airdrome
about 55 kilometers from the existing front line. It was
assigned to duty with the 1st Army Corps, which at· that
time held the front extending from a short distance west of
Chateau Thierry to Courchamps, with two divisions in the
front line. Although the positions of the opposing fore.es
had. somewhat stabilized after the German offensive of
May 27, 1918, conditions were quite different from those
existing in the Toui area. There were a number 9f strong
points hastily organized rather than a continuous line of
trenches. The enemy had also powerful artillery and by
this time had massed the heavy guns that were intended
to support his forl)).idable attack of July 15. A very power­ful
enemy air force had also been assembled, and our
squadrons, accustomed to the lesser and not so highly
trained air forces of the Toul sector, now daily encountered
enemy patrols of some 7 to 20 machines of the latest Fokker
t¥pe and flown by the bellt of German pilots, who were
vigorous and aggre.ssive and .who showed a teamwork and
persistency new to our experience.
O!l July 1, 1918, the American attack on Vaux gave au
oppor_tunity to employ contact patrols and advantage was
taken of this to give all our available teams the experience
which can not be gained otherwise.
The arrival of the 88th Squadron on July 6 completed
this group, which operated as •such from July 7. From
this last date to July 15 the main purpose of operations
underatken was a thorough reconnaissance and surveil­lance
of the· enemy opposite our sector, in order to keep
our command informed of his movements anc;l dispositions.
Missions were sent out for this purpose daily at dawn and
dusk, while other missions were dispatched throughout
the day according to the existing situation. All missions
were quite definite. Great importance was attached to
photographing the enemy works. Visual reconnaissances
and photographic missions were both fraught with diffi­culties
and the enemy often endeavored to interfere with
them. Nevertheless, our staff received timely and impor­tant
information, the result of the work of this observation
group during this period. In addition, a certain number
of artillery adjustments and contact patrols were under­taken.
When the enemy attack finally came and was repulsed
the corps observation worked during every hour of day­light
and again brought invaluable information.
OBSERVATION WORK IN THE COUNTER­OFFENSIVE.
The allied counter offensive of July 18 changed mate­rially
the wprk of the obseryation squadrons. A war of
movement had b-egun and there became apparent at once
the greater difficulties in the way of keeping ground and
air forces closely in touch with each other. Contact
patrols became of far greater importance. Photography
decreased in importance, while the ~egulation of artillery
fire on hostile batteries became much more difficult. Our
patrols; in spite of these obstacles, did obtain important
information and transmit it to its destination. Our corps
observation did effective work, even deep photography.
while enemy attempts' at photography and visual recon­naissance
were greatly hampered by our own pursuit.
Throughout all of these operations, in spite of th& larger
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Apr. May !June I July
U.S. BALLOON COMPANIES
ASSIGNED TO ARMIES IN AMERICAN E. F.
(WITH DATES OF ASSIGNMENT AND DEMOB! LIZATIOI\I)
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number ·of enemy airplanes in this sector and their aggres­siveness,
our pilot.a .maintained their fighting spirit against
heavy odds.
Early in August, 1918, the American 3d Army Corps
came into line on the V esle and an observation group,
consisting of the 88th American s ·quadron and two French
squadrons, was organized for it.a use. The enemy had
paused in his retreat and held strongly the height.a north
of the Veale. The character of the observation work
demanded of both of our observation groups was essentially
the same as that undertaken on the Marne. Added expe­rience
made for greater efficiency, and the difficult prob­lem
of liaison with both Artillery 11.nd Infantry was
attacked with energy. On the whole, it may be stated
that during this, their first taste of real warfare, the obser­vation
squadrons did good service. Though opposed by
a vigorous enemy pursuit, they kept our command
. informed of enemy movement.a and of the locations of our
own troops.
PURSUIT.
The 1st Pursuit Group commenced operations in the
Maqi.e sector early in July, 1918, as part of the Air Service
of the French VIth Army. Here conditions were decid­edly
different from those which had been encountered in
the Toul sector, where single airplanes were comparatively
safe and where formations of three . to six airplanes did
excellent work. In the Chatea.u Thierry sector the squad­ron
formation became the rule almost from the very begin­ning.
At ail times the enemy had a superior number of
pursuit airplanes, the French Intelligence Service esti­mating
the odds at one period to be 4 to 1.
From the.beginning of the German attack on July 15 it
was planned to maintain during daylight hours a double­tier
barrage; one tier at medium-and the other at high
altitudes. For a time it was attempted to utilize a single
squadron formation. This, however, proved unwieldy
and the squadrons were echeloned by separate flight.a,
while it became the rule that no patrol should go out at
medium altitudes without a covering patrol high above.
9
Fighting at all times against he~vy odds our pilot.a carried
the war into the enemy's country and the majority of com­bat.
a took place well within the enemy lines.
Close protection of observation airplanes proved costly
and could be undertaken only exceptionally, where the
moral support afforded justified the probable losses. Pur­suit
airplanes are intended primarily for offensive work.
It is the role of the pursuit pilot to seek and to attack enemy
airplanes. To distract the attention of the pursuit pilui
from this primary duty by directing him to guard obser­vation
airplanes, requiring him to follow them and to
keep track of their movements while at the same time he
endeavors to watch for hostile aircraft, renders him just
so much less efficient. Playing his proper role, devoting
his entire attention to attacking ana driving away or de­stroying
enemy airplanes, the pursuit pilot protects the
observation airplanes more effectively than when charged
with this specific mission alone. It is evident, however,
that thorough _protection to observers cail be given only
when there is a sufficiently large number of pursuit air­planes
to keep the enemy out of the air.
BALLOONS.
Three balloon companies took part in the Chateau
Thierry counter offensive. Two of them operated south
of Soissons, accompanying the 1st and 2d American Divi­sion~
when those divisions, as part of the French Xth
Army, advanced to cut the Soissons-Chateau Thierry
road. The 4th .Balloon Company reached the vicinity
of the Chateau Thierry salient after this counter offensive
was well under way. It join~d the 3d Division and took
part in the advance to the Vesle. These balloon com­panies
not only did valuable work in adjusting artillery
fire but also kept constant watch upon the progress of the
advancing infantry, reporting to the divisional !!taffs new
developments from hour to hour. The aggressive enemy
pursuit aviation brought down 8 of our balloons and 1
more was damaged by shell fire. In all, 12 observers were
forced to make parachute descents during these operations.
CHAPTER III.-ST. MIHIEL.AND THE ARGONNE-MEUSE.
ORGANIZATION FOR THE ST. MIHIEL BA'l'TLE,
On August 10, 1918, the United States 1st Army was
organized. Army headquarters were located at La Ferte­sous-
Joi;.arre but soon moved to Neufchateau, in the vicin­ity
of the St. Mihiel salient, where plans were perfected
for the attack soon to take place th.ere.
In mid-August the American Air Service comprised 1
Army observation squadron, half a dozen corps observa­tion
squadrons, 1 of which was equipped with DH-4
airplanes and Liberty engines, 1 day bombardment squad­ron,
and 14 pursuit squadrons. Two of the pursuit squad­rons
were serving with the British Expeditionary Force.
·In anticipation of the St. Mihiel offensive, the French
placed at the dfuposal of the American Army a consider­able
number of their own air squadrons, which were put
under the command of the Air Service commander of our
own 1st Army.
1446-30--2 0
Additional American squadrons were being equipped
as rapidly as possible. It was a task of no little magnitude
to prepare these new squadrons for actual battle, to organ­ize
the group, corps, and wing staffs, to make dispositions
for sheltering our own units and the French units under our
command, and to link up the units of the Army Air Service
with each other and with the various corps, division, and
artillery production centers by wire, radio, courier, and
'' airplane drop-message" grounds.
On August 26 the headquarters of the 1st Army moved
to Ligny-en-Barrois, and shortly thereafter these French
squadrons reported for duty. An airdrome and a drop­message
station were immediately prepared. The <>rder
of battle of the 1st Army placed the United States 5th
Corps on the left of the line, it.a left flank joining the French
lid Army at Chatillon-sous-les-Cotes; on its right was the
French Ild Colonial Corps, near the point of the salient,
13~//e ville
• •0..J9o0o0 ~­,,
•1000 .,.
!Jri(luent1Y
AIZ/1011 · ./• 0.,6o0o0 . •1100
O.t.--.. -.-.- ~9o6tHlt ts,i vvtq1rd/rroonn
-• -----•A•/ SJ t~!1 11tlllrot1 tJ.!1</ron
'--r-*-f-·Ooll. · TrtlClr
•
1.1001r'l-
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• Mily-tlevonf-d11n,
C,MONTFAUCON
OOAMVILLf:R5
Jt,.]S61{9,
a.9oo~,.
-. ,oooKj ·
1-sT. DAY BOMBARDMENT GROUP
BOMBS DROPPED DURING MONTH OF OCT06E R
'P L. _,,,2 1pM1LES
FIG. 4.
Mo'Jem.olin
/OOKJ ,
0
I
96
TOTAL .,.6,IJ.31( .(so.l"ll
C
11
and on the south side of the salient were the United States
4th and 1st Corps, from left to right, with the right flank
of the 1st Army joining the VIIIth French Army at
Port-sur-Seille.
To each corps was assigned an observation group made
up of French and American squadrons. These corps Air
Service units are component parts of the corps to which
they are assigned and are under the direct orders of the corp
commanders.
The Army observation group was for.med around the 91st
Aero Squadron as a nucleus by adding two new aero
squadrons, the 24th and the 9th, but as these had not had
actual battle experience, they did little work other than
perfecting their own training. The 91st Aero Squadron,
therefore, took care of all of the long-range day reconnais-sances.
.
Four French squadrons were organi2;ed into a group for
the regulation of the army artillery, which included several
regiments of long-range guns capable of reaching the Metz
fortifications.
A number of bombing squadrons belonging to the British
Independent Air Force were also placed at the disposal of
the commander in chief for the coming offensive.
This concentration.of air forces placed under the orders
of the Air Service commander of our 1st Army 701 pursuit
airplanes, 366 observation airplanes, 823 day bombard­ment
airplanes, 91 night bombardment airplanes, a total of
1,481 airplanes, and gave us the largest aggregation of air
forces that had ever been engaged in one operation on the
western front at any time during the entire progress of the
war.
PREPARATION FOR THE ATTACK.
The concentration of forces in preparation for an attack
is a <l,ifficult problem. Any marked increase of aviation
activity is sure to be noted instantly and to arouse the suspi­cion
of the enemy, as every airplane approaching the lines is
tracked both by sight and by sound. During the period of
our intensive preparation road circulation was abnormally
heavy, new gun emplacements were being installed, and
new ammunition dumps established. It was necessary to
prevent enemy reconnaissance of our rear areas at all cost
and this called for much activity on'the part of our own air
forces. There was also an immense. demand by troops
designated for the attack for photographs permitting a
minute study of the terrain. This too caused an increase
of our aerial activity, as did the registration of batteries on
sensitive points in the enemy 's rear.areas. This was to be
the first major action of the American Army, and the staff,
endeavoring to make adequate preparation for it, made
further demands upon the Air Service in the way of visual
and photographic reconnaissances.
All of . the Air Service units 8.l!Signed to this 1st Army
had moved into position before September 12 and had had
"tiine to familiarize themselves with the country over which
they were to operate.
OBSERVATION AT ST. MIBIEL.
The actual operation of wiping out this St. Mihiel salient
required but four days, September 12 to 15. On the first
three days the weather was bad, and while it did not pre'
vent all flying, it seriously interfered with the air program.
Throughout all daylight hours whenever it was possible to
fly, command airplanes, artillery surveillance airplanes,
infantry contact _patrols, and long-range army reconnais­sance
missions were undertaken.
September 14 was the only day when it was possible to
dispatch photographic missions, the results of which were
entirely satisfactory.
Particular credit is due the corps and army Ai.r Service
pilots and observers for their gallantry in flying in most
unfavorable weather, rain, and high winds during the St.
Mihiel operation. The army observation penetrated as far
as 60 kilometers beyond the enemy's front line at a time
when rain was falling heavily and clouds prevented fl_ying
at an altitude higher than about 1,000 meters.
PURSIDT AT ST. MIBIEL.
On September 11, the day before the battle, and on the
· next two days; our pursuit pilots showed the value of fast,
high-powered, single-seater airplanes for missions of visual·
re\!onnaissance in unfavorable atmospheric conditions.
The.se airplanes .could fly at times when it was almost
impossible for the biplace machines to take the air, and
although their pilots had not been specially trained in
observation, they brought back important information of
our advancing troops.
These pursuit pilots also attacked ground objectives or
engaged in "ground straffing," as this work came to be
called. On September 12 American and French pursuit
airplanes found the Vigneulles-St. Benoit Road filled with
the enemy's retreating troops, guns, and transport. _ This
road was a forced point of passage for such of the enemy
as were endeavoring to escape from the point of the salient.
All day long our pursuit airplanes harassed these troops
with their machine-gun fire, throwing the enemy columns.
into confusion. The airplanes of the 3d Pursuit Group,
which were equipped to carry small bombs, did particu­larly
effective work in destroying a number of motor trucks
on this important road.
This ground straffing was effectively continued on Sep­tember
13 and ~4, when good targets presented themselves
on the St. Benoit-Chambley and Chambley-Mars-La Tour
Road~. On September 14 the pursuit pilots devoted most
of their time to their more norm_al work of fighting in the
air, during which they inflicted many casualties on the
enemy Air s·ervice and gained a marked aerial superiority.
This was a day of good weather. Early in the morning it
became evident that the enemy pursuit squadrons had
been heavily reinforced. At least four new enemy organi­zations
were positively identified. The enemy pursuit
fought persistently and tenaciously in an effort to cover
the German retreat, but they were heavily outnumbered
and succeeded only rarely in approaching the line of
battle to attack our observation airplanes. They did,
however, inflict heavy casualties upon our day bombard­ment
airplanes, French, English, and American, when
the latter penetrated deep into the enemy's rear areas.
Throughout the days of the attack particularly good work
was done by the- American 1st Pursuit Group in destroy­ing
enemy balloons. So well was this work done that it
is doubtful whether the enemy received any information
at all from his balloons on the western side of th,\\ salient.
80
20
10
0
S Q 1l A D R O !! S, B A L L O O II C O N P A !I I ES PH O TO SECTIOIIS AIID
.l 1 B P A I!. X S A S S I O !I E D T O .\ .R If I E S I I T H B .l. E. P.
:o.a. J~. ro11r. l!llroh Aprll i:a;, J1111e July
1. 9 1 t
Jf1G. 5.
B.lLLOOII Pllb'l'O
DAT I SntlA])B)l!S Al! PAIRS
COII.PAIIIBS SBlTIO!!S
-1 9 1 8 1
AJl'll 1
Jla7 4 2
.Junt 10 a
July 14 a a 1/1.
August 17 8 ' 2/1.
Sept•b ... 27 16 & '1/1.
October !2 11 ' 16
WOTember " 17 11 1,
Deoanber '5 u · 14 1'
1 9 1 9
Jquar., '5 μ u 17
Ftbl'llal'7 29 12 u 1J - 29 u 14 u
.April 27 11 14 1, - 14 6 6 4·
J- 8 4 4 1
Jaq . ., .. .
two nlghtt of kl Sq,avon .... •• .,. 1a 1'llzt: tra Jae 11a,
1918. "'11'4· .fUgh\ ,i,t(llle4 on Stp"""el' 6'11, 1911,
•LIOllJD•
HIO!O SBlTIOIIS
13
DAY BOMBING AT ST. MffiIEL.
The weather hampered the day hombers throughout the
battle. Expeditions were dispatched daily, but except
on September 14 low clouds and high winds interfered
with formation flying and accurate bombing. Th!;! enemy
opposed this day bombing with all his might, and his use
of his pursuit airplanes in this manner drew them away
from the line of battle and made more easy the work of
our observation airplanes on their all-important missions
of keeping the higher command informed of the progreBB
of the battle and thus assisting in its favorable develop­ment.
NIGHT BOMBING AT ST. MIHIEL.
While the daylight hours during this battle were unus­ually
rainy and foggy, the nights were for the most part
clear. The British Indepel/-dent Air Force cooperating in
the American attack made nightly expeditions to Longu­yon,
Conflans, Metz-Sablons, and other points on the rail­way
line which the enemy was using to bring up reserves,
while the French night bombardment group, containing
one Italian squadron, also attacked these points as well as
enemy posts of command and concentration centers nearer
to the front. The enemy bombers were also very active
at night. In the absen_ce of any night reconnaissance
squadront airplanes ·of the French night ·bombardment
group were used to keep watch over the enemy's move­ments
at night as well as for bombing purposes, and they
greatly aided the Intelligence Section of our Army Staff.
BALLOONS AT ST. MIHIEL.
Under our command 15 American and 6 French balloon
companies took part in this.battle. There were approxi­mately
12 enemy balloons opposite the American sector.
The weather conditions during the first two days prevented
effective balloon observation, but the balloon companies
moved forward with the advancing line and on Septem­ber
14 regulated artillery fire and. sent to the different
army corps and divisional staffs much important informa­tion.
During these September days the 21 balloon com­panies
moved forward a total distance of 202 kilometera
by straight line measurement.
SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS AT ST. MIHIEL.
Despite handicaps of weather and inexperience, the
Air Service contributed all in its power to the success of
this St. Mihiel operation. The staff was kept informed of
developments practically hourly by clear and intelligible
reports. The hostile air forces were beaten ba~k whenever
they could be attacked, the rear areas were watched, pho­tographed,
and bombed. Our airplanes participating in
the battle, by the material damage and confusion which
they caused, helped to increase the total prisoners.
THE ARGONNE-MEUSE OFFENSIVE.
The tactical history of the Air Service prior to the Ar­gonne-
Meuse offensive is largely concerned with its train­ing.
By the end of the St. Mihiel offensive, however, it
was felt at last that the American units then on the front
had developed into trained combat organizations. All
grades, from individual pilots or observers, had learned
much from both the French and British and had had the
invaluable experience of fighting, which alone compretes
the training for war. The American Army, having success­fully
and · with comparatively small loss wiped out the
St. Mihiel salient, was now to undertake the much more
serious task of attacking the enemy's line from the Ar­gonne
to the Meuse, a line which it was of vital importance
to the enemy to hold. During the.period from September
14 to 26, the bulk of the American Army had to be trans-.
ferred to the new attack area. To assure the essential
secrecy was a serious problem for the Arr· Service. The
troop movements had· to be screened from enemy aerial
observation, yet it was desired that no great increase in
our own aerial activity should give to the enemy an indi­cation
of our battle. plans. The attack on St. Mihiel had
drawn there a large part of the enemy's air forces, which
had been operating in the Conflans-Briey area. On the
other hand, while the French had placed at our disposal
some 742 French airplanes for the St. Mihiel battle,
nearly three-quarters of them were withdrawn before
the beginning of the Argonne-Meuse offensive.
The difficulties of close cooperation with the other
arms of the service being fully realized, every effort was
therefore bent toward bringing about a close understanding
between the aerial and ground troops.
CORPS OBSERVATION.
The corps observation units, on arrival in the new sector,
became acquainted with it by using French airplanes
already in that sector, thus avoiding a show of increased
force.
During the entire period from September 14 to N ovem­ber
11, weather conditions remained on the whole unfa­vorable.
Low clouds and fog obscured the ground almost
every morning and afternoon. Ph~tographic missions
were sent out, but were instructed to cover only the most
important points, while elaborate preparations were made
for more extensive work whenever the weather would
permit.
Pursuit machines flew over the observation airplanes
which were engaged on these photographic missions,
and while therr prime object was to attack the enemy,
they furnished protection which was of value.
Where the weather permitted the missions for Artillery
surveillance were successful. Attempts to make adjust­ments
on fugitive targets did not succeed so well. The
batteries were moved frequently and communication was
difficult. The radio work was far below a proper standard,
and in fact nothing but dropped messages, the simplest
but slowest of methods, proved successful.
Visual reconnaissance did supply much valuable infor­mation.
Nothing but the heaviest rain or densest fog WM
permitted to stop these missions by which the corps and
divisional staffs were kept informed of the enemy's move­ments.
During many periods they were the sole source
of information. Infantry contact patrols inc~eased in
their efficiency. Instruction courses were inaugurated
and men from Infantry organizations were given a short
but intensive course in aereal liason, our pilots and ob­servers
were sent into the front line, Infantry officers were
.1e5-fenres.../v-mo1 ~e!>
26ol
Fo:,se
43Bal• Nouorf
Buzonc.y•
4bU.on"!t 'Sqd
12 601
Hd .sc~:; • To ,h'l
Ba1.wl~<.o~B 7 Bo.I
05c..t
LoncJrev1ile
411 C.on<,fr.5q<i•
flev1lle •
.t, ::, 5 C.on;>r,. 5qa
•E.xcrmonr'"
4 b.3 C on!lfr 5qd
14
AIR SERVIC[ UNITS
OF THE
FIRST AMERICAN ARMY
NOV· 11 • J',16
Pur • fur s u,r
C..O •CorpsObservafion
A.O. •Arm4_Dbse rvar;on
NS)f 0 . • NiqhT Obse~vat'ion
A.Arf Ob5,Arm'1Arri Ue~':l
Obs e rva1ion
DB •D0':lt'\0111bardmenf
~ffONTME.DY
ee,rarn
•,ss ~'31'.s..mb 4 d
eYov1ncour(
Hdq IA.0. Gr
'3N-31'. 0 .5qd
e4.,01 A.O. '5qd"'
3A.f>(FI "B) .
e-10 Photo !>ec.:e,
Hdq.l D.6 .Gr.
•Maulan 11·20·9b-166 D.B .'5<j<l,,.
640 '5up.'5qd.(FICA)
12 Pholo.5ec.
F,G. 6.
Gr· Group
5qd • 5quadron
Sup •Suppl':\
Conslr •Cunsrruclion
Bal ·Balloon
Phofo 'Sec •Pholoqroph,c
Sedon
A P•A1r Park(1sr fo65f J or
Squadron ac.fin~ as
AirPar.k
fr :French un1funder
l5f Arm:\
.'. :1
1·
15
urged to visit airdromes and were taken up in airplanes.
By these means and by the wide distribution of educa­tional
matter, there commenced to develop the mutual
understanding which is the foundation of all good coop­eration.
A noticeable departure from methods employed in the
past was the sending out of what came to be known among
our pilots as "Cavalry reconnaissance" patrols. These
were observation airplanes flying at very low altitudes
scouring the terrain immediately in advance of the In­fantry
and returning to drop messages showing the loca­tions
of macbine"gun nests, strong points, or other obsta­cles
in the way of our advance. Although not strictly
their role, such patrols frequently attacked with machim·
guns the enemy's infantry.
ARMY OBSERVATION.
J
During this offensive two squadrons of the army obser­vation
group were assigned to daywork and one to night
reconnaissances. Day reconnaissances were mainly
visual, missions being dispatched as frequently as nece-s
sary in order to keep the sector under constant surveillance.
Airplanes penetrated deeply into the enemy's lines, and
returned with much information of bis rear areas. Photo­graphs
were taken of all railroad centers and important
Points. Of particular value were photographs taken, be­fore
and after fire on these points by the army artillery, of
Montmedy, Longwy, Spincourt, Dommary-Baroncourt,
and Conflans. Though these important. stations were pro­tected
by concentrations of antiaircraft artillery and pur­suit-
airplanes, they were successfully photographed, allow­ing
our artillery to fire effectively during the attack. In
addition, the group kept four command teams constantly
on duty at army Air Service headquarters. These teams
were called upon to perform almost every class of recon­naissance
mission, frequently making flights at an altitude
of not more than 100 meters. Their work proved of great
value to the army staff. As the great part of enemy move­ments
now took place at night, night reconnaissance work
was of increasing importance. In order for this to be suc­cessful,
however, perfect conditions of visibility and a
highly trained personnel are essential. Only a few of our
fliers had as yet become sufficiently experienced in night
reconnaissance, and weather conditions were rarely favor­able.
However, on the ~ew nights suitable for observa­tion,
much information of value was obtained.
PURSUIT.
Our pursuit, on entering the Argonne-Meuse operation,
bad reached a stage at which it ranked in efficiency with
the pursuit aviation of the allied armies. It now con­sisted
of three groups of highly trained squadrons, with
pilots second to none.
The moral effect of an attack by air forces upon ground
troops was fully realized. Furthermore it was believed
that the Germans would use their low-flying battle air­planes
in considerable numbers, to harass our ground
forces, and also that German balloons would be a peculiar
menace to large concentrations of our troops. It was, there­fore,
decided to assign an entire group, the first, to the task
of combating low-flying battle airplanes and to the de­struction
of balloons. This proved a wise measure. On
the first day 10 enemy balloons were destroyed and the
remainder were so constantly attacked that their value to
the enemy was negligible. Many German battle airplanes
were also destroyed, with remarkably small losses to our
own forces. Conditions on both sides bad now reached a
stage at which it was believed that more enemy airplanes
would be destroyed and a greater moral effect produced
by using larger concentrations at points where a etudy of
the enemy's methods indicated he would be present. On
the first day of the offensive, September 26, 1918, a group
sortie was made, and resulted in the destruction of eight
enemy airplanes; a second one the same afternoon brought
down three more. Thereafter, these concentrations were
rp.ade almost daily, weather permitting, the hour and place
being based on the enemy's probable actions. A success­ful
sortie at Bayonville, on October 18, succeeded in bring­ing
40 enemy airplanes into combat. Their formation was
broken up and 9 of them destroyed, the remainder
escaping to their airdromes.
NIGHT PURSffiT.
A study of pursuit tactics would not be complete without
reference to the night pursuit. Whatever the material dam­age
done by night bombing may have been, its moral effect
was very great. This was due in no small part to the con­sciousness
of helplessness. The Germans did little or no
day bombing, but did considerable night bombing and
were believed to be preparing for even more extensive
efforts. Hence every effort was made to combat night
bombers, and a squadron for -this purpose was organfaed
during the Argonne-Meuse offensive. It had little time
in wfi.ich to operate, and was seriously handicapped by
shortage both of material and of pursuit pilots experienced
in night flying. Nevertheless it did succeed on two occa­sions
in coming into contact with enemy night bombers, ·
and the success achieved in a limited time led to the be·
lief that;.tbe night bomber would have been compelled in
a short time either to modify his operations or to adopt
an entirely different type of airplane.
"GROUND STRAFFING."
"Ground strafling" having proved so efficacious this
was continued during the Argonne offensive, and the en­emy's
troops were attacked by our pursuit airplanes with
machine guns and light bombs. Our intelligence reports
showed that a much desired effect was obtained, for the
mere sight of any of our airplanes, no matter of what type,
caused much confusion among the enemy.
DAY BOMBING.
The Argonne-Meuse offensive saw a great improvement
in the work of the day bombardment group. The early
history of day bombardment units bad been one of heavy
losses, not alone in our own service but in that of our allies.
Several steps were taken to prevent this. The utmost
stress was laid on gunnery, and constant practice soon be­gan
to have its effect. Formation flying was insisted upon,
and the bombers were taught that a tight formation meant
safety; an airplane that left the formation was almost cer­tain
to be lost. Objectives now began to be attacked by
the whole group, instead of by a single squadron; and better
cooperation was secured with pursuit. This reduced our
own losses and increased those of the enemy.
FLY l~C Tll!E OF All\ SEI\VI CE ASSIGHED TO ARIIIBS rno11
B E G I I! IT I N G O F O P E R A T I O J', S O II T I L J U L Y lot, l 9 l 9,
DATE
I e,ooo I I
I
l 9 l 8
lfq
i I
I '
\
I I
7,000
Jane
Jul7
,l"4"11t
Sentenbe:r
I' \ : I
\
j ' / . I
6,000
6,000
October
rtovanner ls t
Novenbor 11th
DecGber
l 9 l 9
January
I 1 I l
I I \ I i I
I / \ l
I I I
I I I I . I \I I
4,000
•
:1,000
Februar,
l!•reh
Aprtl
llB/f
J.un•
J~
I I I 'l
I I lj
i I I \ ~. I \ --- --- I I --- '
I "· ,I -- I \\ // \~ ,f/ '"' // "- \
,I \
' ,I / '
I// -- I/ \ -"" V,___ -- , - - -.............__
1,500
1,000
.600
0
llq June J~ A~, Sept, Oot, ~ov.l 1/ov.ll Dec, Jon, Fob, liar, April Mey June July
l~-18 1919
IOOIICB1 Operation Boporta, l4t, 2n4 & 3rd Alllly,
•
l'ORSOIT OBSntVATIO!I
1381,22 Z2:
1166:25 407:49
732 :05 447:40
2'106:50 1006: 35
;i..23,51 867 :33
6498 :02 2675,21
8583:40 4169131
536,68 "32 : 57.
1664:42 1010:17
419·,oe 417,25
946:41 1296: 68
:l91 :14 1369120
928 :1:1 1219,29
589127 1150,21
·619 126 619,10
- -
•LEGEND•
PUI\SOIT
OBSERVATION
BOl!BAI\DIIEIIT
llOLIBAllllill!llT 'l? 0 TA L
110,22
l.li74,14
66:50 lz.6:36
83,45 3997:10
421:41 3713106
1197:53 9771:16
"1526: 14~,11
128110 1098 :05
209,45 288~44
123:20 969163
3711160 2617:29
2111166 2012,29
338 160 2486:32
101106 1840154.
- 1038 ,a& - -
Approved, J~ 3oth, 1920.1-Y
17
Such is the demoralizing effect of bombing, that the
enemy in an effort to prevent it will attack with all his
available forces and at what ever cost. Our own tactics
recognized this fact. As an example, on October 4, Dun­Sur-
Meuse and Landres St. Georges were each hit with a
ton and a half of bombs. Lov. clouds afforded many'pock­ets
for lurking enemy pursuit airplanes, and our bombers
were attacked by a group of 30 Fokkers and Pfalz. They
fell upon our 96th Squadron, which was in the lead, and
which closed in and held these enemy pursuit airplanes at
a distance. Two other bombing squadrons, the 20th and
the 11th, following, attacked this enemy pursuit from the
rear, sqooting down two of them. A general fight then
ensued, during which and when it was hottest, 30 Spads of
the American 2d Pursuit Group, according to plan, arrived
on schedule time and attacked with vigor. The ~nemy,
thus trapped, lost 13 airplanes, while we lost only l.
As further proof of the efficacy of these tactics, over
two-thirds of all the enemy airplanes shot down during this
Argonne offensive were destroyed by jutit such concentra­tions
and under similar conditions.
The material effect of·these bombing raids is also great.
In one such attack on Bayon ville, 250 enemy troops were
killed and 750 wounded. Again these raids invariably
drew enemy pursuit from the rest of the front, rendering it
safer for our corps observation.
The most·remarkable concentration of air forces during
this offensive took place in the late afternoon of Oct6ber 9,
when something over 200 bombing airplanes, about 100
J}Ursuit airplanes, and 53 triplace machines, after rendez­vousing
in our rear area, passed over the enemy lines in two
echelons, A total of 32 tons of bombs were dropped on the
cantonment district between La Wavrille and Damvillers,
in which locality a counterattack had been anticipated
throughou_t the aft1:>rnoon. This concentration was
strongly attacked by the enemy, and during the engagE-­ment
12 enemy airplanes were brought down out of con­trol,
while only l of our own airplanes of all this large num­ber
failed to return.
BALLOONS.
Thirteen American balloons operated during this offen­sive.
They were not inflated until the night of September
25, and the enemy is believed not to have been aware of
their presence. Of particular note is the success that at­tended
the maintenance of liaison. The balloon com­panies
at all times kept pace with the general advance, one
company covering.a record distance of 32 kilometflrs in a
day, over !'!hell-torn ground. NevertheleBB, telephone
co~unication was established at each stage and infor·
mation sent in to corps and divisions.
AMERICANS WITH ROYAL AIR FORCE, B. E. F.
The tactical history of American pursuit would be in­complete
without reference to American pilots and units
with the Royal Air Force. Of the 216 pilots sent to the
Royal Air-Force in the field, some served in British squad­rons,
but two wholly Amerkan aero squadrons, the 17th
and 148th, operated under British wings, in all respects
on the same footing as British units. Still others of the
1446-30--3 0
pilots trained in England, who were intended to be em­ployed
in the American night bombardment program,
were sent to the Independent Force, Royal Air Force, and
later returned to England to act as instructors in the
American Expeditionary Forces school. Confirmed
casualties inflicted' upon enemy aircraft by Americans
serving with the Britis4 totaled 225, whereas their hattle
casualties were 71, or a superiority of 3 to l.
THE 17TH AERO SQUADRON.
Organized at Kelly Field, May 13, 1917, the 17th Aero
Squadron was trained in Canada and at Fort Worth, Tex.
While its future pilots, as individuals in British organiza­tions,
were completing their training with the Royal Air
Force on the British front; the soldier personnei of the
squadron was divided for training into three flights which
were attached to units of the Royal Air Force in the field.
Fina]Jy, organized as a complete squadron, its own pilots
made their first flights over the Dunkirk frOJ)_t on July 15,
1918. From August 18 to September 20, 1918, the 17th
Aero Squadron was engaged at Auxi-le-Chateau with the
3d Brigade, Royal Air Force, in the British drive on
Cambrai. As the ca·mbrai front was broken and the line
swung rapidly. eastward, the squadron moved to an air­drome
near Doullens. from which, under the 3d British
Army, it carried on normal pursuit operations and devel­oped
to a high state aerial bombing by pursuit airpla,nes
and "ground strafing." The squadron completed its
work with the Royal Air Force on October 28, 1918, and
on November 1, 1918, proceeded to join the American 2d
Army on the American front. The advent of an armistice
prevented further service over the lines. In its opera­ti~
ns· from Juiy 15, 1918, the American 17th Squadron
destroyed 64 confirmed enemy aircraft. Twenty-four of
its own members were battle casualties. Its 2,600 hours
over the lines were variously employed in all branches of
pursuit aviation. Four of its flyers were decorated with
the British distinguished flying cross.
THE 148TH AERO SQUADRON.
The 148th Aero Squadron was likewise formed at Kelly
Field, Tex., on November 11, 1917. With its complement
of flyers from Fort Worth, it sailed for England in February,
1918. As with the 17th, the flying officers were sent to
English flying schools and the squadron to the Royal Air
Force in the field. It was on July 20 that the first flight
was made by the squadron over the lines from the Cappelle
airdrome near Dunkirk. The officers of the squadron
were not those who had accompanied it overseas, but were
other American flyers trained in England who had already
been engaged in war flying with the British. After three
weeks of preliminary work on the Nieuport-Ypres front,
the 148th Squadron was sent to the British 4th Army
operating from Albert to Roye, and shortly began it8 share
in the drive on Cambrai. The dropping of 20-pound
bombs on the retreating enemy became a daily feature of
the squadron's work, as did the use of machine-gun fire
against ground· targets. The squadron advanced with the
British and was engaged in all actions in its sector. During
the bitterly contested retreat of the enemy, the 148th
18
TOTAL NUMBER or AIRPLANES DISPATCHED TO ZONE OF ADVANCE
CAUDlrl!r 0 - l!
CAO!l!O!f R - 'J
1). R. 'J
1/lEUroRT 21
!rfl!lltl'.lRT 27
SPAD 16
s~ l.?
CATJDROI\' G - l!
llll:11lORT 2-B
!!IEIJroRT 83
l1!=:3T 81
som~ A-2
SOFll'I'l:!i (CJl.IEL )
A~ II. l
F. J!:. 2-B
SP4D u
BR.mt'?.'r 14-1-2
s. E. r, - ·A
Bll!llll'!lr 14-B-2
SOPYI'm B - 2
,. 11. 2
SOF"IITR A-2
SOPWITP. (C,•LJU)
llRIDUET 14-.\-2
Sl\\D 7
l\'UZ!l'ORT 28
SA=Pll 2-A-2
D. H. 4
SPA!> 13
TOT AL
1,11 OCIDBl!!R . !lOVE!.ml!R . DB:??IB:s:!l •
1918 JAJIOAl!Y . FIIBRU AJif . !!ARC!! . Al'llIL . IL\Y
" .TllllB .. JU"..Y . .\ Of'.UST
." SEPTF:lm uC10llER . IIO'rn.CBEB (to 10121) . :RO~l!!R ( 10th to 30
DB:l!l!BER
TOT AL
SUBDIVIDED AS TO '!TPB
.,o. '---....1 ;::()(J""--.!:200~--300~--...:!4-00~-_;600~-_;6~00"---'7"ioo"--""eoo::;---......:;900,. ~
1
I
• I
I
I
I •• •• •• --•-
l
1
2
2
4
6
8
8
8
2Z
27
l!O
ao
:!6
46
50
66
.,.,
87
lC>a
181
.
• IIICJ.u4ee plaaee d.iap,tohe4, but late:r retumal to fteld.
Sll8li1IYD>l!D All !I> !.ll!ITIIS
0 100 200 IJOO
1
?....-2~--2~--~!--...;400~--!rli00~-~600r---'700~---=8::c00r---'9"'00,-, ~
0
2
I 1 • 18
97 - 61
199
102 ·~
Ml
~--
llJIJ
199 • 2Z I
2!1211
FIG. 8.
19
advanced from Albert to the · Canal-du-Nord, thence to
Le Cateau, and finally to Le Quesnoy, With the 17th
Squadron, it was ordered to the American front on Oct,o­her
28th. The two squadrons proceeded to TouL but
were not again engaged in active operations before the
signing of the armistice. In the course of its work the
148th American Squadron destroyed 66 (confirmed)
enemy aircraft. In accomplishing this it suffered but 11
casualties. In all 2,100 hours were spent over the enemy
lines in· offensive patrols, low bombing and "strafing''
raids, and attack's on balloons. Three of its members
were decorated with the British distinguished flying cross
and one with the distingu~shed service cross.
The individual pilots with British squadrons and thP
two American squadrons serving with the Royal Air
Force were all many times .commended by the officers o
the Royal Air Force · under whom they served dircc-tly
and 'als~ by the General Officer commanding the Roya1
Air Force in the field.
AMERICAN PILOTS ON ITALIAN FRONT.
Of the American pilots trained in Italy, 65 served gal­lantly
with Italian llquadrons on the Italian front and 17
others had been assigned to the Italian naval station at
Foggia-Renatico for operations against Austrian subma­rine
bases. They wwe all commended most highly by
the officers under whom they served.
HONORS AND AWARDS.
Of the Air Service officers and soldiers who took part in
active operations while members of the Air Service,
American Expeditionary Forces, individuals were deco­rated
or cited for great gallantry displayed in action against
the enemy, and the total number of decorations and cita­tions
awarded was 611. One officer receive9- the congres­sional
medal of honor. The American distinguished
servi'ce cross was awarded to 235 individuals, of~hich num­ber
41 were also awarded the oak leaf cluster. Four indi­viduals
we~e cited in American orders. Two individuals
received the British distinguished service cross and 20 the
British distinguished flying cross. Thirty-nine persons
were·awarded the French Legion of Honor, 5 the medaille
militaire, 158 the croix de guerre (and of these 8 individ­uals
were each cited a second time); eight i ndi vid uals be­came
entitled to wear the fourragere, and 149 Americans
(4 of whom twice received this honor) were awarded French
citations. Of the Americans serving with the Italians,
six received the corona d'ltalia, one the medaglia d 'oro al
valor militare (gold medal of valor), two the medaglia
d !argento al valor militare (silver medal of valor), and 41
the croce di guerra. Thirteen Belgian decorations were
bestowed upon Air Service officerf;i, 2 Roumariian, 1 Ser-·
bian, 2 Montenegrin, and 1 Chinese.
GENERAL REMARKS IN THE LIGHT OF
EXPERIENCE.
Nothing but actual experience in battle can complete
the training of any armed force. The first active opera­tions
in which such a force takes part always bring to light
deficiencies from a tactical point of view. This was true
in our own case, but the more largely so because of our fail-ure
to prepare for war until after war was actually upon us.
In addition to this greatest of all causes for our deficien­eies,
there were other points so clearly brought out that it
seems wen to mention those for which remedies exist.
THE AIR SERVICE A COMBAT ARM.
There was throughout our experience a marked ten­dency
on the part of commanders of the larger ground units
and their staffs to regard the air force as a staff service
rather than as a combat arm. There was lack of knowl­edge
of the best ways in which to use this new arm, and
too little regard was paid to the local tactical situation and
to the necessity for the combined employment of the air
force and all other combatant arms. While the air forces
assigned to tactical organizations are entirely under the
orders of the division, corps, and army commanders, in
many cases this command was not fully exercised.
This was due, of course, to lack of experience with this
1,1ewest of all arms, and the remedy is obvious. In the
. future it -Will be essential for all Commanding officers and
their staffs to possess knowledge of the limitations and pos­sibilities
of their air forces just as they know what, for ex­all}
ple, their artillery can or can not do. The Air Service
maY, well originate and suggest employment for its units,
but the final decision rests\tpon the commanding general
of the tactical organization to which they are assigned, and
to regard the air forces as separate and distinct from the
other component parts of this organization is to sacrifice
the cohesion and unity of effort which alone distingliis)J. an
army from a mob.
In the Air SE:rvice as well there was lack of knowledge of
the capabilities of the other arms with which it was asso­ciated.
This was due likewise to the newness of the air
force and to the fact that there had not been time for air
and ground troops to become thoroughly acquainted ,with
each other.
In all future training provil;!ion must be made for Ai;r
Service officers to learn the work of other arms, and par­ticularly
for aerial observers there must be a sufficient
amount of General Staff training which will render of great
value the reports which they must submit. Acting as the
eyes of the Army and making reports upon which weighty
decisions will be based, these observers must be trained.
so that their reports will be accurate and will contain the
facts of real importance.
MOBILITY.
Many of"the conditions which existed during the period
of t rench warfare and fairly stabilized conditions were
greatly modified or ceased to exist with the coming of a.
war of movement. In ·this latter phase mobility is of the
greatest importance and the ability of the air force to
move, like that of all other .arms, depends upon an ade­quate
supply· of transportation. It is a fact that the
efficiency of the air forces was greatly lessened by reason
of the lack ofsufficient transportation. This same lack
existed throughout the Army, but attention is called to it
here because it is believed that the necessity for rapid
movement on the part of air forces and their dependence
upon transportation make it essential that sufficient should
be furnished.
600
575
550
525
soo
415
450
425
400
l 315
350
325
300
215
zso
225
200
115
150
125
100
15
so
25
0
et>. ·Mar.
I I
CASU~L Tl ES o,- U.S. Al R SERVICE. PERSONNEL
(ATTACHED TO AME;l<'ICAN, BRITISH, FRENCH AND ITALIAN Al.'M ICS)
TO Novt:M&ER 11· 1918.
. ~ lll~ _.., . .&ooldant
!.. :4 I:
J .Ii •.
a .; ! .•.. E :: Ill
J1an4 1918. I .
.l..p.r ll 1~18 5 - 1918 18 " ·-· 1918 26 9
~ 1918 112 ll'F
l.11g. \ 918 k 56
Sopto 1918 171 105
Oct. 1918 222 129
to
•OY• 11, 191 255 165
CA1ualti • ot comb< ~ SqUdron
Dec 1.11 '1'ota
FIG. 9.
~Prlsours
..
!.. ! :4 j
:I l' i ! :: I Ill
- l
- 2
" 5
u 10
2Q 12
66 19
82 2,
118 62
150 -15
~ only. ID1td or 4•
I Curmla.tl ...
.s. 0
0 ..
)'
l a
-
·1
2
' 9
u
18
2S
25
eue not
• .E•. ,!I
.
--
l
l
l
s
I ll
a
~0111404
-...... ,fl
"
8
a:,
" 159
219
406
55?
583
•
-~
0
21
DIFFICULTIES AND DELAYS IN FORMING AND
AIR SERVICE.
Again owing to the many technical problems which had
to be solved, to the many diffic ulties connect ed with the
procurement of equipment which had to be overcome,
and to the considerable time that it fakes for training, it
has been shown that it requires longer to place an· effi­cient
Air Service in the field than is the case with any
other arm of the Service. In all planning for the future
this fact must be given full consideration.
NIGHT RECONNAISSANCE AND NIGHT PURSUIT.
During the war just ended the ext reme importance of
night reconnaissance and of night pursuit work was litt le
realized until the spring of 1918. In future wars these two
methods will be- of increasing importance and in time of
peace every effort should be made for their development .
All experience has shown that i.t has become increasingly
dangerous to move ground troops during the day and that
most large movements will take place at night. flans
must be made for night reconnaissance by aircraft in
order that such movements may be detected and inter­rupted
.
DAY BOMBING.
The importance of bombing operations has been men­tioned.
While the material damage done by such bomb­ing
raids has been questioned, and while it has been
proved that in many cases such damage was not great,
there is absolutely no doubt that the moral effect of these
operations is most considerable, and it must be borne in
mind at all times that armies a:re defeated not by abso­lutely
destroying them but by the destruction of their
mo.rale.
"GROUND STRAFFING."
The attack by aircraft upon ground troops, using machine
guns and small bombs, showed clearly. that this has a
most demoralizin15" effect. When properly employed,
this aid from the sky in assisting <foring an attack by our
own troops or in repelling an attack or count~rattack by
the enemy greatly raises the morale of ow own forces and
much hampers the enemy. It will be well to specialize
in this branch of i,iviation and to pr~vide squadrons or
groups with armored airplanes provided with a number
of machine guns and small bombs for just such work against
ground objectives. Lacking such specialfy prepared
airplanes, we did employ our pursuit airplanes in this
way, and at times even our observation airplanes joined
in such attacks upon enemy infantry. Just before hos­tilities
ceased it had been decided by the Air Service to
organi~ a number of such battle squadrons and sample
airplanes had been equipped and armed for their use.
This project should be thoroughly developed in the fut ure:
SHORTAGE OF STAFF OFFICERS.
In common with the re~t of our forces the Air· Service
suffered from a shortage of properly qualified staff officers,
and this too must be borne in mind in all plans for future
development.
SPLENDID MORALE OF AIR SERVICE PERSONNEL.
There must be made some mention_ of the excellent
morale of bot4 flying and nonflying personnel with the
Air Service. The skill of our flyers, the aggressive spirit
displayed by both pilots and observers were beyond
praise. These men asked only to fly and to fight. On
the ground the nonflying personnel with squadrons at
the front were untiring in their efforts to keep the air­planes
in the air. They worked with great spirit and
marked efficiency. Back from the front, at the training
centers, at the production center, at depots and other
stations, officers and men gave the best th~t was in them,
worked whole-heartedly and intelligently; no man spared
himself, and all strove for the common end-to make the
Air Service, American Expeditionary Forces, count for
something in the struggle in which our entire Army was
taking part.
CHAPTER IV.-EARLY PROBLEMS AND THEIR SOLUTIONS:
SEVEN'J,'EEN MONTHS OF ACHIEVEMENT.
When, in April, 1917, the United· States declared war
on Germany, the Air Service of the American Army, then
called th~ A via ti on Section, Signal Corps, had a l!'trength
·of only 65 officers and about 1,100 men. It possessed
about 200 training airplanes, but not a single one of a type
considered fit for service on the actual battle fronts, nor
were any airplanes of this type being manufactured in the
United States. There was no existing foundat ion of
practical experience or knowledge upon which could be
based plans for the development of an overseas force and
for the placing of an aerial army in the air.
Seventeei:i months later, on November 11, 1918, in the
Air Servi ce, American Expedit ionary Forces, there were
7,738 officers and 70,769 men, of whom 6,861 officers and
51,229 men were in France (of this .number 446 officers
and 6,365 men constituted the Balloon Section). Some
768 officers.and 19,307 men were training in England and
the remainder training and fighting in Italy.
There were being operated 26 training schools for pilots
and observers, and in .addition American .officers were
being . trained · in three schools operated by our allies.
From the trlJ:.ining schools· on November 11, 1918, there
had been graduated 1,674 fully trained pilots and 851
observers. There had been sent to the front 1,402 pilots
tmd 769 observers. These schools were being operated
with greater and greater efficiency, as evidenc-ed by the
.fact that between November 11, 1918, and January 1, 1919,
there were graduated 675 pilots and 357 observers.
From the balloon school there had been graduj\ted
a total of 199 officers and 623 enlist ed men , specialized,
who were taught the operation of balloon winches, lookout
work, machine gunnery, and radio operation.
The development of the Air Service, American Expe­ditionary
Forces, during the time we were in this war was
AIR SERVICE STATIONS IN AMERICAN L F.
([STABLISHMf.NT AND DEMOBILIZATION)
120
~zone or A.d,·ance.
110
100
,o
Scrvlci:, Jone
Vol•• ot or C-&J'llllf'tJ• 'Tot.al.
Sunly . AdVIJlC8•
80
10
.ll!.1·
Oct.Qbor _31, 11 2 13
?l'ovember 21, 13 3 l&
PecOt11.lier 26, ,o 3 ~3
60
,....,.,._,
~ So
40
lfil.•
Jan·Jary 23, 26 l.O 36
Februo,y 27, 26 15 41
Karch 27, 33 1 5· 18
Ju:io 26, 38 39 77
Jul7 24 , 2i 54 00
A.U/1'.lBt 28~ 28 ,8 86
Septemoerl8, 20 66 ~4
OOtobor ~. 28 71 9t
Uoven1bor 2.6, 31 7~ 109
December 25, 50 3, 3 92
30
20 ,
10
0
Jul Auq Sep Od Nov Dec J~n Feb Mar Apr. May Ju. Jul Aug Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. feb. Mar Apr May Ju. Jul. Auq Sep Od Nov Dec. Jan.
1 I 1 I I 1 I 1 I I 1 I 1 I I I I 1 I 1 1 I I I I I I I I I I I 1sn I l!Ha I 191~ I
12.ll· 84 Janu,.17 29, 34 0 . 7
February 26, 30 34 8 72
llarah . 26., 24 22 8 M
Ap,rU 30, 24 13 15 .52
·11.,. 28, 9 13 ~ 27
J\llle 25, 8 0 5 1l
,July 23, 6 0 2 ' Aut~t 18, 5 0 1 6
SoptemDer30, 2 0 0 2
Oot.o\>er 31, 2 0 0 2
llo"'rd>or 30. 2 0 0 2
Deceab•r :n, i 0 0 2
.UPIIOVlb '2./Jl /tO,
FIG. 10.
23
the result of much effort during which..delays and technical
difficulties were being overcome. It .is proposed to give
a brief account of the way in which the problems were
met and solved.
PREWAR INFORMATION.
Shortly before the declaration of war five officers of the
Aviation Section, Signal Corps, had been sent to Europe.
One was an observer, one was in the office of a military
attache, and three were flying students. Owing to the
short time they had been on this duty tli~y had been
unable to send to the Unite States much information of
real value.
DEVELOPMENTS IN WASHINGTON, AND THE
FIRST PROGRAM.
To collect data, to coordinate the interests of the United
States, and to pro.:-ide for. the production of aviation.
Il1aterial, the Aircraft Production Board of the Council of
National Defense began its work in Washington in May,
1917, just after the arrival of military missions sent by
the French and British, which brought with them certain
information concerning the character of the aviation
equipment needed . A cable had been received from the
premier of France in which he urged the United States
to form a flying force of 4,500 airplanes to be on the front
during the campaign of 1918. This program, it was
stated, would neceS8ita.te 5,000 pilots and 50,000 mechanics
and require 2,000 airplanes and 4,000 engines to be con­structed
monthly in American factories. The Aviation
Section of the Signal Corps and the Aircraft Production
Board adopted the program contained in this cablegram,
and it was subsequently approved by the General Staff
in Washington·and became the basis of the whole develop­ment
of.American military aviation. The Joint Army and
Navy Technical Aircraft Board in Washington was called
upon to determine the number of airplanes which should
be produced for this force. It reported that for service
use on the front 12,000 airplanes and 24;000 engines
would be necessary.
CREATION OF TllE AIR SERVICE, AMERICAN
·EXPEDITIONARY FORCES.
Shortly after his appointment, the Commander in Chief
of the American Expeditionary Forces appointed Maj. T.
F. Dodd, A. S. S, C., as aviationofficer, ·AmericanExpedi­tionary
For.ces, and a member of his staff.
Upon his arrival in France in June, 1917, qeut.Col.
William Mitchell, A. S. S. C., one .of the five otficers pre­viously
mentioned as being on duty in Europe, succeeded
Maj. Dodd as aviation officer. The aviation activities _
were at once separated from Signal Corps·control; hence­forth
the Ait- Service, American Expeditionary Forces\
was considered an organization on a ·footing similar to that
of other combat arms of the Service.
FIRST AIR PROGRAM, AMERICAN EXPEDITION·
ARY FO_RCES,
Xhe Commander in Chief instructed his staff to prepare
at once a program ,for the American Expeditionary Forces.
The result of this work was the general organization proj­ect,
approved July 11, 1917, and intended to be merely
a preliminary draft outlining the desired tactical organ­i
zation of the overseas forces. This project provided for
only 59 Air Setvice squadrons to balance the then pro­posed
number of ground troops. Later it was learned that
the United Stat~s had adopted an Air Service program as
proposed by the French , 4,500 airplanes on the front during
the campaign of 1918. This number was the equivalent
of about 260 aero s1uadrons, and in order to conform to the
United States plan, the additional 201 squadrons were in­cluded
in what was known a,s " The service of the rear
project," approved by the Commander in Chief, Septem­ber
18, 1917. This program also included additional bal­loon
companies in accordance with recommendations
received from the French general headquarters.
GROWING DIFFICULTIES OF LIAISON BETWEEN
EUROPE AND AMERICA.
It soon became apparent in Washington that questions
concerning types of equipment to be manufactured and
the materials req uired must be stutlied first-hand in
Europe. It ,vas essential to secure samples of the types
of aeronautic equipment to be manufactured in the United
States and all necessary technical data, much of which had
never been committed to paper and which could be found
only among those actually engaged in such work. Serious
questions arose with respect to royalties demanded by the
European Governments on behalf of their citizens who
were inventors or owners of special processes and devices.
Without careful study on the ground it was obviously
impossible to determine just what would be the require­ments
of a production program, what should be built in
Europe, what in America, the assistance the United
States. could render the -Allies or- receive from them, the
opportunity for training American perso.nnel in European
schools, or the relative priority of the various demandR
made by the Allies upon the United States.
WORK OF THE AERONAUTICAL MISSION.
In order that all these matters might be investigated
with accuracy and dispatch, the aeronautical mission of
the Aircraft Production Board was sent to Europe ~n June,
1917, under the charge of Maj. R. C. Bolling, S. 0 . R. C.
This w..ission included 2 flying officers of the Army, 2
officers of the Navy, a number of industrial experts, and
93 skilled mechanics and factory experts whom it wa$ in­tended
to place in factories for the purpose of securing
first-hand practical information regarding methods of man­ufacture
which coiild not be readily embodied in plans and
specifications.
This mission ma:de a thorough canvass of.the production
situation in England, France, and Italy. The principal
matters with which tt dealt during the first few months
were the principle ·of free . e·xchange between the A.Hies
and for the dutation of the war of the rights to manufacture
alf classes of aeronautic material~ the rapid transmission
to the United States of sample airplanes, engines, and
accessories, with data necessary for their production; the
collection of general information needed · for American
producers; the choice of types of aircraft to be produced
in the United States; the possibility of purchasing aviation
material in Europe; the assistance the United Sta.tea could
give to the Air Services of the Allies. including the alloca-
24
tion of raw n:iaterials; the possibility of sending personnel
for training in Europe; and the coordination and standard­ization
of aircraft production in all Allied countries, with
the consequent elimination of obsolete types wherever
manufactured .
This ae,ronaut.ical mission performed invaluable work in
gathering and transmitting to the United States essential
information and in bringing together- more ~losely than
had hitherto been the case the Air Services of1taly, Eng­land,
and France on questions concerning the production
and allotment of material.
PROCUREMENT OF MATERIAL
The studies of this mission early convinced its members
that no matter how optimistic were the promises of pro­-
duction in the United States, nothing in the way of finished
and satisfactory aviation material could be .expected to
arrive in Europe from the United States before about
July, 1918. This meant that the Air Service, American
Expeditionary Forces. in order to participate in the spring
campaign of 1918 must obtain elsewhere its necessary
equipment.
A contract with the French, known as the agreement
of August 30, 1917, was prepared and signed by the French
Air Ministry and the Commander in Chief, American Ex­peditionary
Forces. This contract provided that the
French Government would deliver to the Air Service,
American Expeditionary Forces, by June 1, 1918, 5,000
airplanes and 8,500 engines. On its part, the United
States was to furnish by November 1, 1917, certain speci­fied
tools and raw materials needed for the fulfillment of
the French obligation. It provided also that the air­planes
and engines to be furnished by February 1, 1918,
would be supplied eveh though the United States should
be unable to deliver, on schedule time, its q'uota of mate­rials
and tools. It was upon the provisions of this agree­ment
that the Air Service, American Expeditionary Forces,
planned its program of training and of putting squacfrons
in the field.
MOTOR MECHANICS RETURN TO U~ITED
STATES.
Small squads of the mechanics who had accompanied
this mission were sent back to the United States from time
to time, carrying to the Aircraft Production Board the
lessons they had learned and valuable samples of aero­nautical
material. Eighteen of these men were later
examined and commissioned in the Air Service.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE ORGANIZATION.
The magniWde of the problem confronting the Air
Service soon made it necessary to enlarge the organization.
Col. William Mitchell, still with his title of avi~tion officer,
American Expeditionary Forces, was given jurisdiction
and control over the Air Service in the Zone of Advance
!u.le Maj. Bolling, on account of the knowledge he had
gained concerning questions of production, was given
charge of aviation in the Zone of In_terior, as it was then
called. At this time Maj. Bolling was active in the organ­ization
of an Interallied Aircraft Board which did import­ant
work coordinaling the. various 11,ir programs of the
Allies and of the United States.
This organization, with one officer in charge at the front
and an officer in charge at the rear, resulted in divided
responsibility. General Orders No. 26, Headquarters
American Expeditionary Forces, August 28, 1917, ap­pointe!
l Col. (later Maj. Gen. ) William M. Kenly, then of
the 7tJ;t Field Artillery, Chief Aviation Officer, American
Expeditionary Forces. On September 3; 1917, Gen. Kenly
was announced as Chief of Air Service, American Expe­ditionary
Forces. Maj. (later Col.) 'Bolling remained in
charge of the Air Service, Lines of Communication, with
the title of Assistant Chief of Air Service, his headquarters
being in Paris. Col. WiUia"in Mitchell became air com­mander,
Zone of Advance. In the early part of Septem­ber,
.1917, the offices of the Chief of Air Service and of the
air commander, Zone of Advance, were moved to Chau­mont,
where were established the headquarters of the
American Expeditionary Forces.
EARLY WORK IN THE ZONE OF ADVANCE.
During the early autumn of 1917 the work in the Zone
of Advance colll!isted chiefly of making plans and projects
for future development. No squadrons were then avail­able
for duty at the front except the 1st Aero Squadron,
which had arrived in Europe on September l, 1917, and
after a period of training at A vord had been located at
Amanty, near the 1st Corps School.
The main problems at the front were therefore the prepa­ration
of organization projects, the selection of suitable
sites for airdromes and supply depots, and :he study of
Air Service tactics and strategy. These · studies were
made first-hand with the French and British Air Services
and in connection with the operations of their ground
troops.
FIRST AIR DEPOT.
The construction of the 1st Air Depot at Colombey-les­Belles
was begun uyon' the arrival of the first available:
troops in October, 1917. It was realized that the AiJ
Service would need such a depot as a receiving and dis­tributing
point for personnel, material, supplies in general,
and a8 a site for shops for engine, airplane, and motor
transport repairs which were not serious enough to require
shipment farther to the rear. At this locality there would
also be needed an airdrome to accommodate several squad­rons.
The buildings originally authorized covered 185,977
square feet, but this authorization was increased in Sep­tember,
1918, to 587,293 square feet, of which oy Novem­ber
11, 1918, 357,363 square feet had been completed.
PROBLEMS OF THE REAR SCHOOLS AND
TRAINING.
The task of the Assistant Chief of Air Service Lines of
Communication· was the making of all preparations for
placing the fighting units at the front and the providing
for their training, their equipment, and their maintenance .
This was a huge and complex undertaking which necessi­tated
great foresight and much organizing ability. The
fall of 1917 was occupied particularly with the establish­ment
of schools and training centers sufficient in number
and capacity to provide for training Air Service per13orUtel,
flying and nonflying. The known lack of train:jng ma­chines
and other essentials in America made it improbable
that the United Stll,tes could produce before fanuary 1,
25
1918, more than 500 pilots, and these with no more than
preliminary training. To meet the immediate emergency,
it was necessary to take advantage of schools already estab ­lished
by the Allies . . As early as June 26,.1917, c~bles were
sent to the United States calling-for cadets who were there
waiting flying training to be sent to Europe to be trained in
French, English, and Italian schools. The officers of the
1st A_ero Squadron and such other flying officers as could
be spared from administrative- or technical duties were
sent to French finishing schools. A Training Section in.
charge of all this instruction was organized. Three train­ing
schools were. immediately started . The site at Issou­dun
recommended by the French military mission to the
Unit{ld States was accepted, and during the latter part of
July, 1917, the construction of a center for advanced flying
training was begun. A French school· already in opera­tion
at Tours was taken over about November 1, 1917, with
the intention of using it for preliminary training. Later
this developed into an important center for training army
corps pilots and observers. .Another small French school
already in operation at Clermont-Ferrand was also taken
over in November, 1917, to be used for the developnv.mt
of day bombardment pilots and bombardiers.
THE LAFAYETTE FLYING CORPS.
On October 1, 1917, orders were-issued creating a board
of officers to examine those members -of the Lafayette
Flying Corps, then serving with the French, who desired
to transfer to the American Air Service. This organiza­tion
of American volunteers contained many experienced
pilots trained in the best schools of France and serving in
French squadrons on the front. Ninety of these .:nen
were ~ventually transferred to the Air Service, American
Expeditionary Forces, and gave invaluable assistance in
building up ·our own pursuit aviation. Three of our pur­suit
groups have been commanded by former Lafayette
flyers, and this corps provided us also with a considerablt.
number of squadron commanders, flight commanders, and
experienced instructors.
SOLDIER PERSONNEL.
It waa necessary to make provision for the instruction,
classification, and assembly into squadrons of the Air
Service personnel to be sent from the United States. The
training of .soldiers as mechanics and riggers was from the
first a serious problem. Not only were such men arriving
from the United States entirely unacquainted with
foreign airplanes and engines, but few of them had been
trade tested, and their officers were likewise inexpe­rienced.
Earnest efforts to establish a mechanic's school
in France failed, owing to the impossibility of obtaining
suitable buildings and material for instruction. It there­fore
became necessary to train these men at the flying
centers, although it was known that this system would
result in decreased efficiency in these cent ers. So great
was the shortage of personnel that these enlisted men ,
while presumably undergoing training, had to carry on
all of the work at the posts to whi<;h they were assigned
and in many cases had to assist in their construction. Two
hundred mechanics were placed in seven French airplane
factories near Paris, where they serveg until January 24,
1918. There were assigned to French aviation fields 475
1446-30--4 0
soldiers, the nucleus of a much larger number which it
was intended temporarily and for instruction to place in
French schools in proportion to the number of American
flyers being trained therein.
An important agreement was made with England on
December 5, 1917, whereby a total of 15,000 mechanicE
were to be kept in England under instruction, and in addi­tion
a total of 6,200 laborers were to be assigned to tem­porary
duty in that country. It was provided that these
mechanics would be withdrawn for service in France
when other untrained personnel was ·sent from the-United
States to take their places. It was expected that there
would thus be established a constant flow of men trained
in England under what was the nearest possible approach
to service conditions and that such men would be ready
.when they reached Franre to take their place in our own
squadrons.
TECHNICAL SECTION ORGANIZED.
A Tecltnical Section of the Air Service was organized.
It was to secure and compile technical information from
every poBBible source. This section was also charged
with the responsibility for recommending the types of
airpianes, engines, motor cars, photographic and wireleBB
appliances, and all other apparatus and equipment to be
purchased in Europe or produced in the Un1ted States.
LIAISON SECTION.
In accordance with the orders of the Chief of Air Service
that all negotiations with the air ministries of allied Gov­ernments
should be carried on by the ABBistant Chief -of
the Air Service, Lines of Communication. a Liaison Sec­tion
was established in November, 1917, ·which sooner or
later acted as an intermediary in all questions of supply
from foreign sources.
SEARCH FOR MATERIAL.
The European markets were canvassed and such mate­rial
as would serve our purpose was ordered. This in­cluded
airplanes for service and training purposes, trucks,
and automobiles, hangars, and innumerable articles of
equipment , instruments, and accessories.
RECOMMENDATION OF AIRPLANES - DH- 4.
In order to hasten the time when materials produced in
America would be available, it was neceBSary to gather
and forward to the United States all poBBible information
on allied Air Services and the equipment used by them
and to mitke recommendations concerning the various
types of airplan~s, armamemt, motor-transport equipment,
and accessories to be put into production in the United
States for use overseas. This called for much study and
the exercise of good judgment on the part of the members
of the aeronautical mission. I ts first recommendation
was that the DH--4 airplane be built in the United States.
In the spring and summer -of 1917 this machine, equipped
with the Eagle Rolls-Royce engine, had been tried on
the British front, where its performance in speed and
altitude and in climbing ability surpassed that of other
airplanes then in use over the lines.
It was believed that this airplaJ,J.e, with the Liberty
engine, of greater horsepower and lighter than the Eagle
26
Rolls, would be satisfactory for our use. Assurance was
received from the United States that the first of these
machines would be delivered in Europe by-January, 1918.
As a matter of fact, the first deliveries in quantity of these
machines in Europe were not made until Jun.e and July,
1918, and by that time the supremacy of the DH-4 had
been partially lost. This is an illustration of one of the
difficulties always encountered in recommending. any
type of aircraft for production and for future use. If the
type chosen is merely in the experimental stage it may
turn out to be entir~ly unsuited for the purpose it was to
serve; if it has passed beyond this stage and proven of
value by actual use at the front, so rapid is the develop­ment
that by the time it could be produced in the United
States and delivered in Europe it may have been rendered
obsolete by improved machines.
the single-seater machines on the front. The British
Bristol Fighter, biplace pursuit, had given ~.remarkable
performance during the summer of 1917. Very fast and
easily maneuvered, it had the advantage of four machine.
guns instead of two and was able to defend itself from
attack from almost every direction. If it were possible
to install the Liberty engine in this airplane it was thought
that it would be eminently satisfactory for our use. Ac­cordingly
the production of this Bristol Fighter with th.e
Liberty engine was recommended.
RECOMMENDATION OF PURSUIT MACHINES.
These facts apply with marked emphasis to the second
instance, the recommendation that no single-seater ma­chines
should be built in the United States for service at
the front. The improvement in pursuit airplanes was
so rapid that few types retained their superiority for more
than six months. In the summer of 1917, the Spad with
the 150 Hispano-Suiza engine },lad been in use for nearly
a year, but although it still held first place among single­seaters,
its supremacy was threatened by the Spad Mono­coque
with the 160-horsepower Gnome Monosoupape
engine. This airplane was, however, still in an experi­mental
stage, and though it was reasonably certain that
the Spad would ultimately be displaced, it was by no
means sure what would . supersede it. The Hispano­Sulza
Co: had increased the power of their engine to 180
and even to 220 horsepower. The former did not give a
sufficiently great increase in performance and the 220
horsepower was not at that time fully perfecteo.. Of all
single-seater types then being tried it seemed that the
Spad Monocoque would be the machine of 1918.
To those charged with the selection of machines to be
produced in the United States, it was plain that none of
the pursuit type could be built in time to insure that they
would not be out of date when actually placed in service
on the western front.
The Allies took this same view and made urgent and
persistent recommendations that the building of single­seaters
be not attempted in. the United States, while they
promised to supply the Air Service, American Expedi­tionary
Forces, with all such machines as would be needed
for its program. Simultaneously the Gnome 160-horse­power
engine intended for use in the Spad Monocoque
seemed to be a failure.
Such were the conditions and the recommendations
mjl.().e in July and August, 1917, based upon the best in­formation
then available. This is what actually took
place. The Spad Monocoque proved a failure; the Mono­soupape
Gnome as first produced had not the power of the
original model, nor was it sufficiently reliable for service;
on the other hand, the Hispano-Suiza 220-horsepower was
developed so satisfactorily that the Spad thus equipped
maintained its position as the leading allied pursuit ma­chine;
the Liberty engine was not successfully adapted to
the Bristol Fighter; and the deliveries of the DH-4 were
so delayed that it had lost much of its effective superiority
by the time it reached the western· front. All of these
facts are now well known but it is helpful to recall the
picture as it appeared in the summer of 1917.
ALLOCATION OF RAW MATERIALS.
With the arrival from the United States of raw material
for the Allies, it became necessary to allocate and distrib­ute
it. It had become apparent that one of the weaknesses
of foreign aviation was the total lack of standardization
which resulted in a system of unregulated private manu­facture.
This was notably serious in view of the shortages
which existed of certain materials, such.as spruce, linen,
and dope. To use up such valuable materials in the manu­facture
of antiquated airplanes made the situation the
more critical. The dictation of what airplanes should be
built was at that time a matter of great delicacy.
In order to bring about standardization, the Interallied
Aircraft Board was created, with Col. Bolling as the first
American representative, and it did most valuable work in
bringing together the French, British, and Italian Air
Services on these vital questions.
CONSTRUCTION.
Inftuenced by all of these known facts, the United
States was therefore advised not to attempt the manu­facture
of pursuit airplanes and that its greatest service
could be rendered by confining its production efforts· to
the larger machines, which would probably be subject to
fewer modifications and improvements, and to the manu­facture
of engines.
The construction of schools, ware4ouses, depots, in­dustrial
plants, and salvage and repair shops was an evi­dent
necessity in the development of the Air Service
system of supply. The great scarcity of personnel and of
material made it impossible to solve this problem fully
until the summer of 1918. As considerable amounts of
raw material collected at the ports in the early fall of 1917,
warehouses for temporary storage purposes were needed.
The training centers then under construction lacked labor
and material. As airplanes from the United States were
expected during the first months of 1918, plants had to be
established for their assembly. Depots for salvage and
repair of airplanes, while they would not be needed for
some time, had to be started in order that there might be
no delay after the Air Service commenced actual opera­tions.
The Air Service building program evolved called
Furthermore; ther~_Wa.1! some evidence that-the summer
of 1918 would see the development of biplace pursuit
machines .vhich would at least partially replace some of
CRIIP
Ollll!IA,"ICI
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dmblhtrati
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FIG. 11.
Bdq, .th CO!'J>8
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Balloon
Section
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I fil!UIJIDOO.t
llaDUel
Dlrtaton
!dq, 6th Corps
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D1'11sloD
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With Pralob
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28
for the immediate construction of 4,749,300 square feet
of floor space.
CREATION OF AN ORGANIZATION.
The creation from personnel then available in Europe
of an organization capable of carrying on all these projects
seemed at the outset a hopeless problem. , Scarcely any
American personnel trained in Air Service activities was
available in Europe, and the neceBBity of retaining in the
United States the small number of experienced men pre­vented
assietance from that quarter. Even of clerical
assistants, supply officers, and men with technical train­ing,
there was a woeful deficiency, with the result that
France, England, Italy, and the entire American Expe­ditionary
Forces were combed for needed personnel.
Nearly all technical communications and most current
correspondence were in a foreign language, making neces­sary
a number of interpreters and stenographers capable
of taking dictation and writing in both French and Eng-
. lish. In spite of all these difficulties and some wasted
effort diBBipated in needless friction, the accomplishments
during the period from June until December, 1917, were
of magnitude and of the utmost importance to the Air
Service of the American Expeditionary Forces.
OUTLINE OF THE ORGANIZATION.
The organization of the entire A,ir Service during this
time had been approved by the· Commander in Chief in
September, 1917.
The Chief of Air Service, American Expeditionary
Forces, was in command both in the Zone of Advance and
in the Lines of Communication, responsible to the Com­mander
in Chief for the efficiency of the entire service.
The air commander, Zone of Advance, maintained a staff
comprising officers charged with administration, opera­tions,
information, and a materiel department. He was
charged with the organization and equipment of units
formed in the Zone of Advance and with the actual prepa­ration
for the employment of what were then-known as the
tactical and strategical air forces. The Assistant Chief of
Staff, Lines of Communication, had under his control
departments of administration, production, finance,
transportation, and the Technical Section. The director
of Air Service instruction, under the A'BBistant Chief of
Air Service, Lines of Communication, was in charge ·oJ
personnel, materiel, instrvction, and the transportation
aBBigned for his use. These subbranches of the Air Servicf'
communicated directly with each other, all matters ol
policy, however, being controlled by the Chief of Air
Service, America_n Expeditionary Forces. •
CHAPTER V.-REORGANIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT.
REORGANIZATION.
In November, 1917, Brig. Gen. B. D. Foulois, Air
Service, arrived in France and was placed in charge of
all Air Service activities in the American Expeditionary
Forces on November 27, 1917. A reorganization of the
Air Service, employing largely personnel which had
accompanied the new Chief of Air Service from the
United States, was effected. Officers were placed in
charge of the following sections: Policy, Administration,
Techincal, Training, and Organization, Balloon, Personnel,
and Supply. Col. Bolling was relieved as ABBistant
Chief of Air Service, Lines of Communication, to assumll
the position of chairman of the .Joint Army and Navy
Aircraft Committee, created with the approval of the War
Department, in pursuance of a resolution of the Aircraft
Board in Washington. Actual authority for the formation
of this committee in the American Expeditionary Forces
was later given by general headquarters, and the Chief
of Air Service was designated· as its · chairman. The
purpose of this committee was to coordinate industrial
with military and naval activities in Europe and the
United States and to constitute the proper official channel
through which should pass all communications with the
European nations relative to aircraft material. During
the early months of 1918, while the most strenuous deveL
opment of the Air Service was being undertaken, this
committee 813Sisted largely in the coordination and alloca­tion
of raw, semifinished, and finished aircraft products.
SHORTAGE OF PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT.
The shortage of men and materials still constituted the .
most serious difficulty in carrying out the projects already
initiated and in a further development of the Air Service
according to its original program. It was clearly evident
that there was not time to train personnel in .the United
States and that no facilities for such training existed in
France, and at the beginning of December, 1917, the
outlook in this direction was almost hopeleBB. ·Although
such a contingency had not been contemplated in the
agreement with the French of August 30, 1917, the French
6overnment later claimed that the 5,000 airplimes which
it had promised could not be produced by the personnel
then available in its factories. It accordingly requested
the United States to send 12,000 mechanics to aBBist in
the French Motor Transport Service, so that an ·equivalent
number of their own men might be withdrawn for work
in airplane factories. It was promised t:qat thus the
terms of the August 30 contract could be fulfilled. This
request was approved by the Commander in Chief upon
t]:ie recommendation of the Air Service, American Eipe­tionary
Forces. The Air Service in the United States
undertook to organize the desired persoI!Ilel. The men
were concentrated, trade tested, and organized into com­panies
on a regimental basis upon tables of organization
which contemplated their use primarily for service with
the French Army. The first of these motor-mechanic
regii;aents did not arrive in France until February 24,
AIRPLANES RECEIVED FROM ALL SOURCES
FROM BEGINNING OF OPERATIONS TO D[C.~1-1,16.
(MONTHLY flGU~ES)
1,0IO .--,---,,----,,----,,----,,----,,----,.--,--,---.--,.-~-~---.---~
eeo ~ PRANCE
~ lffll"l'ED ST,i'r!!S
~ENGL:JID
- ITALY
&80
160
60
0
,Sept. Oct. ::ov. Dec. Jan. Feb.
FllAHCE 19 103 298 113 235 296
UIIITED STATi'!S
EIIG.Llffl)
ITALY 19
'l'OfAL 19 103 298 113 235 316
Jl!ar.
308
308
April l!a,y Juno
248 311 469
19 M
15
2"8 330 1538
FIG. 12.
Jul7 Aug. Sopt, Oot.ll'oT.11 lfOT. Dec.
673 605 616 '-26 168 90 l
1"3 312 237 401 60 227
37 33 39 82 6" 22 l
853 960 792 909 272 339 2
r .
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Apprond1 ~ ? ,,t.j~
!O'llll,
<&,8'.19
l,"'3
2111
19
6,62<&
29
30
1918. This and 1.h~ next regiment to arrive we're assigned
to duty with the French under an agreement made by
the War Department in Washington in the early spring
of 1917 at the time of the visit of Marshal Joffre's military
mission.
LOCATION OF AIR-SERVICE PRODUCTION
CENTER AT ROMORANTIN.
It was still foreseen that no matter what. assistance in
the way of material would be received .from the Allies, it
would be absolutely necessary to erect a plant in which
material received from the United States could be assem­bled.
This ph!.nt, known as Air-Serv_ice Production
Center No. 2, was located at Romorantin, and its con­struction
started on January 1'6, 1918, with a projected
persontlel ef 19,000 men and ab. authorized area of build­ings
of 3,685,400 square feet.
REMOVAL OF HEADQUARTERS FROM PARIS.
In February, 1918, when the headquarters of the Lines
of Communication were transferred to Tours the Air
Service personnel which had been on duty in Paris was
likewise ordered to Tours. As, however, most of the ma­terial
which was to be procured in Europe would come
from French factories, and as most of the factories producing
such material were located in Paris or in its vicinity, as
moreover the Technical Section of the French Service
was likewise in Paris, it soon became apparent that it
would be absolutely necessary to return the Supply Sec­tion
to Paris, where it was relocated on April 30, 1918, and
continued to perform its work.
DEPENDENCE UPON FOREIGN PRODUCTION.
In the early part of 1918, it became evident that until
at least the 1st of July complete reliance would have to be
placed upon foreign production, especially French, for all
aircraft and other material needed for our Air Service pro­gram.
It was also apparent that the French would be
unable to carry out thfi terms of the August 30, 1917, con­tract,
as their promises had been b!IBed upon too opti­mistic
estimates of the production possibilities of their
manufacturers, and the Air Service, American Expedi­tionary
Forces, was therefore confronted with the possi­bility
that there would be grave lack of flying equipment
for the squadrons which might be placed at the front. This
prospect was made more serious by the very great enlarge­ment
of the French and British air programs for 1918, which
demanded of both of these countries supreme efforts for
the fulfillment of their own needs. These facts made it
important for the Air Service to conclude new contracts
for the production for its use of foreign airplanes, engines,
and accessories. Fully apprised of the gravity of the
situation, the Commander in Chief, American E;xpedi­.
tionary Forces, abrogated the agreement with the French of
August 30, 1917.. Weeks of negotiation finally produced
another contract with the French known as the agreement
of May 3, 1918, by which the French engaged themselves to
supply us with avia_tion material equal both in quality and
quantity to that supplied to their own forces and in pro­portion
to the number of our di'\risions in France. This,
however, was largely contingent upon the receipt of raw,
semifinished, and finished products from the United
States. Owing to continued insistence by cable, there
had been received by May 1, 1918, approximately 90 per
cent of the machine tools and raw materials called for by
the original agreement of August 30, 1917. The new con­tract
of May 3, 1918, and various conferences between the
headquarters of the Allied Commander in Chief and our
own General Headquarters assured the Air Service of suffi­cient
material for the enlargement it might be able to
realize. The . concluding of this agreement proved the
turning point in the history of American aviation supply
questions in France and laid the foundation of the supply
for our efforts at the front.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE BALLOON PROGRAM.
Fortunately for the Balloon Section of the Air Service,
the balloon industry in France had been well developed
through the previous 10 years, and there were available
industrial facilities for the production of captive balloons
and the necessary accessories. Contracts were placed for
such material with the French in September, 1917, and
there had also been drawn up for the Balloon Section a
sound production program of material to be manufactured
in the United States. The organized training and equip­ment
for the Balloon Section therefore progressed steadily
and with a minimum amount of difficulty compared with
like problems in the Heavier-than-Air Service.
One of the chief difficulties of the Balloon Section was
the procurement of sufficient hydrogen and gas, and it
became necessary to .draw upon the United States for
approximately 1,500 tons of ferrosilicoR and 238 tons of
caustic soda. Special apparatus, such as winches and
tenders, did not arrive from the United States in the quan­tities
expected, and this compelled us to call upon the
French for such equipment, although a lack of raw mate­rials
for its production caused a shortage never quite made
up until hostilities ceased.
CHAPTER VJ.-PERIOD OF EXPANSION.
NEW CHIEF OF AIR SERVICE.
By General Order 81, G. H. Q., A. E. F., May 29, 1918,
Brig. Gen. (later Maj. Gen.) Ma.9on M. Patrick wa.9 an­nounced
as Chiei of Air Service, American ·Expeditionary
Forces.
PROBLEMS.
By this date the program for the ground troops of the
American Expeditionary Forces had been greatly enlarged
and it · became nece~sary to employ the small numbers
of Air Service personnel. in such a way as to maintain
in operation the numerous Air Service establishments.
The development of the production center at Romorantin
was pressed to the utmost. The acceptance park .which
had been established ai Orly near Paris was enlarged;
the completion of the aviation instruction center at Isaou­.
dun was hastened, as it soon became apparent that the
w
16500
16000
15000
14000
18000
12000
11000
10000
9000
8000
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6000
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2000
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MONTHLY ARRIVAL 01' AIR SERVICE PJIRSOll!!EL Ill
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DA 'I! II
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32
expected fully trained. personnel would not arrive from
the United States in time and that this instruction center
would be required to train large numbers of flying officers
needed to meet the Air Service program. Another grave
question was the procurement of sufficient aerial observers
to meet the needs of the increased number of American
divisions to be placed at the front.
202-SQUADRON PROGRAM.
The most pressing problem at this time was the bal anc
ing of the Air Service program with the enlarged program
for ground troops. The rate at which such ground troops
arrived from the United States had been greatly increased
hy the utilization of British tonnage which had been
made available after the opening of the enemy offensive
in "the spring of 1918, and ll corresponding change in· the
Air Service program was imperative. Instead of heing
composed of one army of five corps the American Expe­ditionary
Forces was now to be a much larger body. At
the same time while the shipment of ground troops from
the United States wall proceeding at this increased rate
the sending of Air Service personnel was absolutely
stopped for some months. A balanced Air Service pro­gram
to correspond to this increase and at the same time
to develop on the front an Air Service in proportion to the
number of divisions, corps, and armies then contemplated
was sent hy the chief of staff, American Expeditionary
Forces, to the Chief of Air Service on July 29, 1918. From
the Air Service point of view, however, the delays already
experienced in procmement of material and in the arrival
of personnel made it imperative that the original Air
Service program must he decreased rather than increased.
The Commander in Chief realized fully the existing
conditions and that thfJ Air Service could not carry out
the enlarged program, and therefore approved a modifica­tion
which covered the formation of observation squadrons
to meet the requirements of the artillery and infantry
and of only 60 pursuit, 14 day-bombardment, and 27 night­hombardment
squadrons.
This revised program submitted by the Chief of Air
Serviqe, August 16, 1918, and approved on August l'i', UJ18,
became known as the "202-squadron program" and was
based upon the very best estimates then obtainable of the
total number of squadrons which might with great &ffort
be placed on the front by the end of June, 1919. It was
formulated after consideration of the programs which
each of the Allies expected to carry out by that date.
It was also based upon a very careful estimate of 'the
material which could be secured as indicated by the pro­duction
probabilities in the United States and known
conditions in the factories in France and England. The
opinion that the personnel to carry out this program would
be available was founded upon cable advices earlier re­ceived
from the United States indicating what would b'e
available for sending overseas.
It was thoroughly realized that the Commander in Chief
and the authorities in the United States wished to place
on the western front the largest and the most efficient
Air Service which could he equipped and maintained .
CONTINUED PROBLEM OF PERSONNEL.
The de'.iciency of commissioned and enlisted personne
previously emphasized was at all times a serious matter
Priority had been granted to the Air Service for approxi­mately
7,500 men per month from November, 1917, and
cables from the United States indicated that such numbers
would be sent, but this personnel did not arrive. After
March 21. 1918, the date on which the enemy· broke
through the allied front, a practical embargo was placed
upon sending from the United States of any other th.an
Infantry and machine guns, which absolutely stopped
the coming of Air Service personnel.
It was impossible to draw upon the mechanics trained
in England, as this same embargo prevented the sending
of 1mtrained men to take their places. One result of thil!
lack of much-needed men was the inability even to main­tain
existing Air Service establishments in operation at
full capacity, while their enlargement and the undertak­ing
of new projects was an absolute impossibility. T1ie
Air Service training centers planned and under construc­tion
would neecl, to operate at full capacity, not less than
11,000 enlisted men. Since these men themselves had to
be trained, results of any magnitude could not be expected
until after a lapse of from five to six months from the time
of commencing operations at these centers. The Air Serv­ice
program at the front had contemplated active oper­ation
on a considerable scale by July 1, 1918. This meant
that on January 1, 1918, there should have been available
for work at the schools alone at least 10,000 men. On that
date there were, however, in the whole Air Sen-ice,
American Expeditionary Forces, only 5,600 enlisted men
and these were nearly all entirely untrained. The imper­ative
need of men for work in the Zone of Advance and
at the supply depots continually decreased the small num­ber
of squadrons available for service at the schools.
Issoudw1, which should have had not less than 6,000 men
in February, 1918, was in that month reduced to 2,700,
and this number could not be increased beyond :::, 700
until August, 1918.
The arrival of even 10,000 men in the early spring of
1918 would have advanced the Air Service program on
the front by approximately four months, but it was not
until the late summer that the arrival of Air Service
troops in France in considerable numbers actually com­menced.
MOBILIZATION OF PERSONNEL-COORDINATION
STAFF.
The distribution of these squadrons to their ultimate
destinations in what was now called the Services of Supply
(S. 0 . S.), or in the Zone of Advance needed careful regu­lation
in order that the reai necessities at each station
should be met in the fullest measure possible. The mobi­lization
of these squadrons and their distribution was
first handled by the Personnel Section, Air Service, and
later by what was called the Coordination Staff, created
o provide a central body to assure a thorough understand­ing
and complete accord among all Air Service activities,
excepting actual combat operations in the Zone of Ad­vance,
to balance the needs of the different sections, to
provide for the proper allocation of available personnel,
and as a center of information concerning all Air Service
matters. This staff developed plans which were carried
out up to the date when hostilities ceaserl . All sections
of the Air Service m~e their requests for personnel to
AIR SERVICE PERSONNEL IN AMERICAN E F.
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I I I -1 I I I 1 I 1 I 1 1 1 11 1 1 1 I I 1 I I 1 .I 1 1 1 . I I I 1917 I 1918 I 1919 j19zoj
FIG. 14.
34
-this staff, which secured notification of the dates of arrival
in France of all Air Service unite, and was responsible
that the necessary orders were prepared in advance so
that there might be no delay in the movement of these
troops after their disembarkation.
As it was found that the arriving squadrons_ were unbal­anced,
many of t.heir men not having been trade tested,
practically all of them were sent to St. Maixent, where
there had been established a concentration post for Air
Service troops, and where facilities had 'been created for
trade testing and completing the organization and .equip­ment
of all squadrons before sending them to th~ desti­nations.
This staff kept if.self informed daily of the
progress of the work at St. Maixeut and kept constant
track of the movements of all Air Service _ personnel
throughout the American Expeditonary Forces. It was
also responsible for the a.'3Bembly at proper times and places
_ of all of the equipment intended for the squadrone going
to the front, and for its delivery to the squadron supply
officers, and in general for the regulation of the movements
of all personnel and equipment so that the minimum delay
would ·be experienced.
In addition, this staff made calculations of the personnel
and material required to meet each part of the entire Air
Service program. It maintained records of Air Service
development, of the capacity of Air Service establishments,
and of the demands made upon them. Its Accountability
Division was charged with a systematic inspection of Air
Service projects under development. The Plans and
Progress Division was responsible for the provision of dat:i,
for proposed development. Weekly progress reports cov­eril)
g all Air Service activities were prepared and issued.
EXECUTIVE SECTION.
The Executive Section succeeded to the duties of the
Coordination Staff on November 4, 1918. When the proc­ess
of liquidation became necessary, after November 11,
1918, the valuation of all Air Service property was done
by this section.
PERSONNEL SECTION.
The Personnel Section dates frQm July 23, 1917. Its
duties, although on a smaller scale, may well be compared
to those of the aqjutant general of the American Expedi­tionary
Forces. Upon it have devolved the maintenance
of complete records of all personnel of the Air Service, the
iBBuance of orders to such personnel, and ot]ier duties
necessary in the distribution of all Air Service forces.
During the first months of its operation it was also charged
with recruiting in Paris, examining over1i00 applicants from
the American Ambulance and other American activities
in France. The Air Service post office Wa.'l likewise at
first a branch of this Personnel Section. In February,
1918, it moved to Tours, where•it has been maintai.Iled
ever since._
CABLE SECTION.
Of the greatest importance in the administration of th.e
Air Service is the Cable Section.- In the early days the
ABBistant Chief of Air Service, Lines of Communication,
sent cables covering Air Service production problema
direct to Washington through the American embassy in
· Paris. There Wa.'l a reAulting•initial saving of time, but
an aftermath of mixed and incoherent· references, and the
transmiBBion of cables to the United Sta.tee without" the­sanction
of the general staff, American Expeditionary
Forces, led to a temporary lack of coordination of Air Ser­vice
efforts and those of the remainder of the American
Expeditionary Forces. This w88 later corrected and the
cable office W88 specifically charged with handling all sucl,i
y:iessages and with seeing that needed approval was secured
before they were transmitted to the United S~tes.
INFORMATION SECTION,
The Information Section W88 first created at Air Service
headquarters, general headquarters, in September, 1917.
Its efforts were mainly directed toward the collection of
such data 813 would be useful in the development of the
Air Service, American Expeditionary Forces.
The present Information Section is a growth of an Intelli­gence
Section, Air Service Training Department, organized
in Paris in December, 1917. During the cl?5ing months
of the war it W88 a central collecting and distributing
agency within the Air Service for technical, military,· and
aeronautical data. Its work was concretely expressed in
comprehensive bulletins, of which 313 were issued. Secret
documents of importance were circulated among the proper
officers and general inquiries of all sorts were answ.ered.
Intimate relations were mainta.ined with the French and
British Air Services and with Washington by means of
special officers who traveled between these centers.
·During the year 1918, 25,725 miscellaneOl)ll publications
and 19,169 maps were distributed. Early in the year a
French-English Aeronautical glOBBary W88 compiled after
exhaustive research. In September, 1918, an-.information
officer was appointed at each of the training centers.
During the summer of 1918, preliminary work, which was
foreseen to..be necessary for the compilation of a history of
the Air Service, American Expeditionary Forces, was
aBSigned to this section. The armistice aitered the situa­tion
and necessitated the rapid completion of this history.
Col. E. S. Gorrell, assistant chief of staff, Air Service, was
aBBigned to prepare/ an exhaustive record covering the
narrative, statistical, technical, and tactici,l history of the
Air 'Service. Having been aBBigned to this duty at Tours
on January 9, 1919, such portion of the Information Section_
personnel 813 was engaged on this historical work was trans­ferred
to his direct control, leaving the remainder of the
Information Section to bring to a conclusion the other
work with. whi~h it was changed.
35
JI
U.S.AIR SERVICE A.E.f'.
iOURS·F'RANCE
HEADQUARTERS
ASS'T CM1£f" Of" AIA StRYICC
lOC.AltON . WITH AtSP£CT TO NA.JOA
AIA SUI.YI([ STATIONS IN rAANCC . • ,,., - ,,,e
.II [ 'F HtSfOlh 011,t)ION
•~f(lll:MAflO~ .GllOVP- O.A.S AP!"'.~, 1,20
-4<B.DIT-..ERRA.NEAN
6to A DtC.CN .. "'f!OT Oe•ns ..... .,.
FIG. 15.
CHAPTER VII.-THE WORKING ORGANIZATION.
ORGANIZATION AIR SERVICE, AMERICAN EXPE­DITIONARY
FORCES, NOVEMBER 11, 1918.
It seems appropriate that there should be given a state­ment
of"the organization of (he Air Service, American Ex­peditionary
Forces, at the time when hostilities ceased
and when it was a cohesive working body.
THE CHIEF OF AIR SERVICE, AMERICAN­EXPEDITIONARY
FORCES.
Responsible to the Commander in Chief for the organiza­tion,
training, material